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INTRODUCTION
On July 22, 1917, a man named Jesse Dunning was dining in a restaurant
in Bemidji, Minnesota, when the town’s chief of police, Frank Ripple,
detained him on a charge of “suspicion.” Accompanied by the Beltrami
county attorney and a fellow officer, Ripple took Dunning to the local
headquarters of the union for which Dunning worked, the Industrial Workers
of the World, or IWW. Ripple’s search of the headquarters turned up two
staples of IWW literature: a pamphlet called Sabotage: The Conscious
Withdrawal of the Workers’ Industrial Efficiency, written in 1916 by IWW
organizer Elizabeth Gurley Flynn; and a small book simply called Sabotage,
written by the French anarcho-communist, Émile Pouget. The discovery of
these books confirmed in Ripple’s mind that Dunning needed to be behind
bars, and Ripple took the union man to jail.1
Dunning was one of six IWW men arrested in Bemidji around this time.
Months of union activism among lumberjacks in the area had converged with
wartime militarism to generate hysteria about the IWW. After a fire destroyed
the local lumber mill, union people were accused of leading a campaign of
sabotage. A 150-strong, club-wielding posse patrolled the streets of Bemidji
and rounded up so-called troublemakers—IWW members. Most of these
“Wobblies,” as the union’s members were universally called, were then
deported from the area. Of those who were arrested, only Dunning was
prosecuted. He was accused of violating Minnesota’s “criminal syndicalism”
law, a serious charge indeed.2
The prosecution alleged that Dunning engaged in criminal syndicalism
by “distributing” the books on sabotage and working for the IWW. During
his trial that fall, Dunning acknowledged belonging to the IWW and working
on behalf of the union. But he professed that he had not read either Flynn’s
1. Art Lee, Hometown Hysteria Bemidji at the Start of World War I, 49 MINN. HIST. 65, 74 (1984).
See generally Petty Political Clacquers Fall in Attacks upon Truthfulness of Pioneer’; Here’s the Proof,
BEMIDJI DAILY PIONEER, Oct. 10, 1917, at 1 (covering the case of Jesse J. Dunning).
2. Lee, supra note 1, at 74-75; Petty Political Clacquers Fall in Attacks upon Truthfulness of
Pioneer,’; Here’s the Proof, supra note 1, at 1.
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pamphlet or the Pouget book. Dunning also denied any connection to the fire
at the mill, which figured prominently in the state’s case, even though there
was no evidence to suggest that any Wobblies were involved in the calamity.
Nevertheless, on September 29, 1917, Dunning was found guilty and, several
days later, sentenced to two years in prison. And so Dunning became the first
person in America ever to be convicted of this rather remarkable crime.3
Enacted only four months before Dunning’s arrest, Minnesota’s criminal
syndicalism law forbade advocating for “political or industrial change” by
means of “sabotage,” “terrorism,” or other criminal acts; to this end, the law
barred both membership in an organization and publication of documents that
promoted change by these means.4 In the statute’s conception, “syndicalism”
itself had no particular meaning, beyond an association with the IWW.5 Proof
that a defendant himself had advocated sabotage or terrorism, let alone
actually engaged in such things, was completely unnecessary. In fact, police
and prosecutors could arrest and charge people like Dunning based solely on
their association with the IWW and rely on judges and juries to credit their
assertions that, because the union had embraced these prohibited means of
social change, the defendants were guilty.
This is exactly how things were intended to work. Minnesota was one of
twenty-one states to enact a criminal syndicalism law between 1917 and
1920.6 Like these other states, Minnesota did so with the intent to criminalize
the IWW, which had been founded in 1905 around a vision to organize the
whole of the working class irrespective of skill, race, ethnicity, or gender.
Although committed to peaceful means, the union was a revolutionary
organization. It proposed to eventually topple capitalism with a massive
general strike, and in the meantime demanded that workers should command
higher pay, better working conditions, and more control over the way their
jobs were performed. When Dunning was arrested, the IWW was especially
active among migratory workers west of the Mississippi, making the union a
threat to the interests and social vision of powerful capitalists and their allies.
In turn, the capitalists and their allies sought to use the law to destroy the
union.
In the late 1910s and early 1920s, thousands of IWW members were
arrested and prosecuted for relatively minor crimes like vagrancy, as
membership in the union was sufficient proof of guilt for those crimes, too.7
3. See Lee, supra note 1, at 74; Eldridge Foster Dowell, A History of the Enactment of Criminal
Syndicalism Legislation in the United States 1072 (1936) (Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University)
(on file with author); see also Convicted as Criminal Syndicalist, INDUS. WORKER, Oct. 6, 1917, at 3
(reporting the sentencing of Jesse J. Dunning).
4. Act of March 14, 1917, ch. 145, § 1, 1917 Idaho Sess. Laws, 459-60.
5. See, e.g., id.; see also Dowell, supra note 3 at 18-22.
6. Dowell, supra note 3, at 12-13.
7. See, e.g., Ahmed A. White, A Different Kind of Labor Law Vagrancy Law and the Regulation
of Harvest Labor, 1913-1924, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 667, 668 (2004).
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This program was also important to the effort to destroy the union. But the
bid to annihilate the IWW was, for our purposes, most revealing when it
relied on serious charges, which involved not only criminal syndicalism but
also prosecution under the federal Espionage Act.8 By the end of 1917,
several hundred Wobblies were on their way to being convicted of violating
the federal statute, which, like the criminal syndicalism laws, was enacted in
part to criminalize membership in the IWW.
This campaign to use the criminal law to destroy the IWW began before
World War One and extended through the Red Scare into the 1920s. This
program was sponsored by politicians, newspapermen, and elites at every
level of society, in addition to powerful Western capitalists in lumber,
mining, agriculture, and other industries. Conservatives played a crucial role.
But Progressives—the direct ancestors of today’s liberals—were also central
to this campaign. Progressives’ ranks were dominated by those who viewed
the IWW’s radicalism and its militancy as unacceptable affronts to their
vision of a well-ordered society and who embraced the use of the law as a
means of putting the union in check. From local police like Bemidji’s Frank
Ripple, to important state officials, like John Lind—the former governor of
Minnesota and head of that state’s Public Safety Commission—to Woodrow
Wilson himself, Progressives were at the forefront of this effort. Ultimately,
their campaign resulted in several thousand IWW members being arrested
and jailed and hundreds imprisoned on criminal syndicalism and Espionage
Act charges.9
By the mid-1920s, the IWW was essentially defunct, destroyed in
significant part by these prosecutions. Although it never quite disappeared
and has even experienced a modest revival, the union has never recovered.
Its bold vision of a world in which capitalism and wage labor is supplanted
by a workers’ commonwealth survives mainly as an object of nostalgia and
romance. If these were the only important consequences of the use of these
laws against the IWW, its legacy would be significant. But the implications
of this campaign go much further. Indeed, as this Article shows, the
criminalization of the IWW is important to understanding the debased
condition of the labor movement even today, over 100 years after Dunning’s
arrest.

8.

Espionage Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-24, 40 Stat. 217, Jun. 15, 1917.
On the role of Progressive figures like these in the legal persecution of the IWW, see Letter
from Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, to T.W. Gregory, Att’y Gen. of the United States
(Apr. 3, 1918) (on file with National Archives, Washington D.C., General Records of the Department of
Justice, General Correspondence, Record Group 60, Records of the Office of the Pardon Attorney, Record
Group 204); ERIC THOMAS CHESTER, THE WOBBLIES IN THEIR HEYDAY 165-66 (2014); MELVYN
DUBOFSKY, WE SHALL BE ALL: A HISTORY OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE WORLD 393-97
(1969); KATHRYN S. OLMSTED, RIGHT OUT OF CALIFORNIA: THE 1930S AND THE BIG BUSINESS ROOTS
OF MODERN CONSERVATISM 122-24 (2015).
9.
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By foreclosing the kind of leftist, anti-statist, unionism that defined the
IWW’s approach to labor organizing and activism, the enforcement of these
laws reshaped the labor movement. With the IWW driven into irrelevance,
Communists, whose less skeptical views of Progressives and the role of the
state in labor relations were shaped in part by the Wobblies’ experience,
became the standard-bearers of a new kind of labor radicalism at a crucial
moment in the country’s history, one that embraced both Progressives and
the state. In the 1930s, unionists in this mold joined with Progressives,
increasingly called liberals, to advance a vision of reformist, state-sponsored
unionism that would culminate in the so-called “Popular Front” unionism of
the Second New Deal period. A pillar of the New Deal, this new unionism
presided over the labor movement’s unprecedented growth in the 1930s and
1940s. But its vulnerabilities and limitations were quickly exposed when the
Popular Front unraveled; Progressives, or liberals, resumed their opposition
to labor radicalism, and the state retreated from its support for labor rights.
As this new reality took shape in the postwar period, American workers were
left, not only with little effective representation, but also without a viable
tradition of labor radicalism. In view of this history, it seems that the
movement’s situation today can be only be fully understood by taking
account of the kind of thing that happened so long ago to Jesse Dunning.
Of course, to make this claim in a plausible way is also to understand its
limitations. Repression was not the only reason the IWW collapsed. Other
factors, including internal dissension and wide-ranging opposition to its
radicalism, played a significant role. Similarly, the successful repression of
the IWW was certainly not the only reason that the Communist Party took up
the banner of leftist industrial unionism and reshaped its meaning in the
Depression and war years. Nor is a misplaced dependence on liberalism, law,
or the state the only reason that the once-mighty post-war labor movement
has declined so precipitously. Among the many other factors at work were
unfavorable changes in demographics and political economy, as well as
inadequate leadership and a tendency toward bureaucratization that drained
the movement of its vitality. But running through all these developments was
a set of truths about liberalism, law, and the state, and their relationship to
unionism—especially radical unionism—that can only be fully understood
by confronting what happened to the IWW.
This Article’s account of how law, repression, and Progressivism shaped
the labor movement is a new one. Much has been written about the labor
movement’s decline. But none of this work has traced the roots of this decline
back to the criminalization of the IWW, whose demise is seen more often as
the inevitable fate of a flawed experiment than as a means of understanding
the labor movement’s broader failure.10 Moreover, while historians have long
10. See, e.g., DUBOFSKY, supra note 9, at 480-84; see also PHILIP DAY, THERE IS POWER IN A
UNION: THE EPIC STORY OF LABOR IN AMERICA 404-05 (2011).
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recognized the contradictory, often anti-labor character of Progressivism,11
this attitude is not common among legal scholars and, in any case, no one has
yet unfolded Progressivism’s role in shaping the course of labor history in
the manner in which this Article does.12 Likewise, although the rise and fall
of “voluntarism,” as anti-statist unionism is usually called, is an important
theme in the study of American labor, the focus of scholars on this topic has
been mainly on the right-wing voluntarism of the American Federation of
Labor (AFL) whose relative decline in the 1930s and 1940s in the face of
competition from a rival federation, the Committee for Industrial
Organization (CIO), is usually presented as a positive development in labor
history.13 This Article is not only about a different type of voluntarism; it also
unfolds from the history of leftist voluntarism a different set of implications
about the future of organized labor in this country.
This Article unfolds in six parts. Part II describes how the IWW’s brand
of labor voluntarism arose in concert with Progressivism, as both emerged
from the social, economic, and political conditions created by the reign of
industrial capitalism in the late nineteenth century. Part III describes the
IWW’s ascent in the late 1910s and explains how, as this development
converged with the war and Progressivism, it led inexorably to the enactment
of the criminal syndicalism laws and the Espionage Act. Part IV documents
how these laws were enforced against the union. Part V reveals the complicity
of the courts in this campaign, including the role of Progressive judges.
Focusing on both institutional effects and the devastating consequences of
prosecutions for union members, Part VI describes how enforcement
undermined the IWW. Finally, Part VII develops this Article’s claims about
the long-term legacies of the union’s repression.
I. VOLUNTARISM, PROGRESSIVISM, AND THE ROOTS OF REPRESSION
It was the IWW’s fate to be born out of the same social and political
conditions that would frame its destruction. By the time the union was
11.

See SHELTON STORMQUIST, RE-INVENTING “THE PEOPLE”: THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT,
(2006); CHAD PEARSON, REFORM OR
REPRESSION: ORGANIZING AMERICA’S ANTI-UNION MOVEMENT (2016); GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH
OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916 (1963).
12. One partial exception to this tendency is the criticism of the New Deal regime of labor law as
insufficiently grounded in the alternative tradition of popular constitutionalism that reigned in the early
twentieth century. See, e.g., James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause
Labor and the Reshaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921-1957, 102 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1 (2002).
13. See, e.g., William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1111 (1989); JULIE GREENE, PURE AND SIMPLE POLITICS: THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR
AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM, 1881-1917 (1998); ROBERT H. ZIEGER, THE CIO, 1935-1955 (1995); ART
PRIES, LABOR’S GIANT STEP: THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS OF THE CIO: 1936-55 (1964). To be sure, some
historians of American labor have not only highlighted the virtues of the IWW’s vision of voluntarism,
but also situated it in parallel with the AFL’s voluntarism. See, e.g., HOWARD KIMELDORF, BATTLING FOR
AMERICAN LABOR: WOBBLIES, CRAFT WORKERS, AND THE MAKING OF THE UNION MOVEMENT (1999).
THE CLASS PROBLEM, AND THE ORIGINS OF MODERN LIBERALISM
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formed, industrialization had radically transformed American society. Older,
more stable systems of employment, bound by tradition and often intimate
social relationships, had given way to anonymous, often extraordinarily
capricious and insecure relationships. Once governed by its own rhythms, the
workday had become a servant of efficiency and the profit motive, with
twelve-hour days and six-and-a-half and seven-day work weeks common.
Work was fraught with dangers, too, as the use of ever more powerful and
complex machinery converged with the profit motive and the desperation of
working people. Indeed, while the advance of industrial capitalism yielded a
tremendous increase in social wealth, this was distributed quite unevenly,
leaving many workers in dire need and many more on a narrow precipice that
separated everyday life from ruin.14
In this context, unionism emerged as a means for workers to push back,
to assert control over working conditions, to increase compensation, and
reduce hours of work, if not also challenge the social order. But such efforts
consistently met with resistance. In the name of the “open shop”—the
libertarian pretense devised by the business community to justify its strident
opposition to unionism—the firing and blacklisting of strikers and union
organizers was commonplace.15 So too were espionage, intimidation, and
assaults of union people at the hands of company police and hired muscle.16
Unionists also had to contend with the repressive power of the state. In
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, courts issued thousands of
injunctions against unions engaged in strikes and boycotts, and repeatedly
invalidated laws that advanced labor’s interests.17 On countless occasions,
police and prosecutors arrested union people, broke up their picket lines, and
prosecuted them on charges ranging from disturbing the peace to murder and
even treason. Governors and presidents also contributed to this repression,
mobilizing state and federal troops to break strikes in the name of keeping
the peace. In so doing, they abetted the killing of hundreds of union people
while standing mainly silent as employers and their agents killed hundreds

14. For useful discussions of the realities of life in industrial American, see, for example, HERBERT
G. GUTMAN, WORK, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY IN INDUSTRIALIZING AMERICA (1977); MELVYN
DUBOFSKY, INDUSTRIALISM AND THE AMERICAN WORKER, 1865-1920 (2d ed. 1985); DAVID BRODY,
WORKERS IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA (1980).
15. SELIG PERLMAN & PHILIP TAFT, HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES, 1896-1932 12937 (1935); see Allen Wakstein, The Origins of the Open-Shop Movement, 1919-1920, 51 J. AM. HIST.
460, 460-62 (1964).
16. On the prevalence of these methods, see generally STEPHEN NORWOOD, STRIKEBREAKING AND
INTIMIDATION: MERCENARIES AND MASCULINITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2002); ANDREW
KOLIN, POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LABOR REPRESSION IN THE UNITED STATES (2018); S. REP. NO. 76-6
(1939).
17. See Forbath, supra note 13, at 1151; FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR
INJUNCTION 60-81, 24-46 (1930); GREENE, supra note 13, at 84; Herbert Hovencamp, Labor Conspiracies
in American Law 1880-1930, 66 TEX. L. REV. 919, 945-58, 962-64 (1988).
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more in a largely one-sided struggle that, by the turn of the century, had left
the labor movement thoroughly battered.18
This grim reality shaped the evolution of the American labor movement
in its early years. The state’s bias against labor drove the mainstream of the
labor movement, led by the AFL, and its long-serving president, Samuel
Gompers, to reject the state and its political and legal systems as means of
advancing labor’s interests. Instead, the movement embraced voluntarism, a
philosophy of labor activism marked by a strong preference for strikes,
boycotts, and other forms of “direct action,” rather than law and political
organizing, as the primary means for advancing labor’s aims. Indeed, so
strong was this commitment to voluntarism that for the AFL and most of its
more than one hundred affiliated unions, the law and politics were conceived
mainly as means of diminishing the power of the state to limit direct action.19
The IWW emerged from this same milieu. The union was established in
Chicago in the summer of 1905 by a diverse array of Socialists and left-wing
dissidents from the AFL, including people associated with the Western
Federation of Miners, a union of “hard rock” miners with a socialist bent and
a penchant for militancy.20 The IWW’s founders explicitly conceived of it as
a radical alternative to the AFL.21 Even more so than Gompers and other AFL
unionists, those who led the IWW embraced direct action and saw law and
the state as institutions that were destined to do employers’ bidding in a
capitalist society.22 Moreover, unlike the AFL, whose voluntarism was
deployed in the service of a conservative vision of labor organizing—
premised on “bread and butter” or “business” unionism—the IWW’s
voluntarism was married to a program of revolution that was premised on the
destruction of capitalism.23
Few employers went out of their way to welcome the AFL and its brand
of unionism. But opposition to the IWW was something else entirely. The
union’s combination of ideological radicalism and tactical militancy
qualified it for revulsion and certified it as a criminal organization. Never
mind that the IWW generally eschewed violence, except in self-defense, and

18. Philip Taft & Philip Ross, American Labor Violence Its Causes, Character, and Outcome, in
THE HISTORY OF VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND
PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE 270 (Hugh D. Graham & Ted R. Gurr eds., 1969); Paul F. Lipold & Larry W.
Isaac, Striking Deaths Lethal Contestation and the “Exceptional” Character of the American Labor
Movement, 1870-1970, 54 INT’L REV. SOC. HIST. 167, 201 tbl. 4 (2009).
19. Forbath, supra note 13 at 1116, 1124-25, 1202-07; GREENE, supra note 13.
20. DUBOFSKY, supra note 9, at 76-87.
21. DUBOFSKY, supra note 9, at 82, 93-95; PHILIP S. FONER, THE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE
WORLD 29, 32-33 (1965).
22. See, e.g., INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE WORLD, THE FOUNDING CONVENTION OF THE IWW:
PROCEEDINGS (New York, Merit Publishers, 1969).
23. See KIMELDORF, supra note 13, at 115-20 (comparing the politics and ideologies of the IWW
and the AFL).

2021

LAW, LABOR, AND THE HARD EDGE OF PROGRESSIVISM

173

was far less inclined to resort to force than AFL unions.24 From the time it
was formed, the IWW was the primary target for the most aggressive forms
of labor repression.
The same conditions of crisis and disorder that led to the formation of
the IWW itself also helped determine the kind of repression it would face. As
industrial capitalism yielded an ever-expanding array of conflicts and social
problems, including a continuous upwelling of labor conflict that came to be
known simply as the “labor problem,” the classical liberalism that initially
served as its guiding ideology evolved into what historians have called a
“new liberalism.”25 This new liberalism was anchored in a handful of
defining themes. Prominent among these was the enduring view that law and
the state were both essential and preferred institutions for managing society
and redressing the shortcomings of the social order.26
Progressivism, as this new liberalism was also known until it came to be
called simply “liberalism,” was never radical. Progressivism had its social
roots in an expanding middle class of professionals, managers, small and
medium sized capitalists, and affluent social reformers. Consistent with the
interests and social outlook of these people, who were themselves products
of industrial capitalism, Progressivism was always a philosophy of
responsible capitalism and reconciled to the prevailing social order.27 It was
a philosophy geared toward acknowledging and confronting the problems of
private property and capitalism without questioning capitalism’s essential
precepts or forgoing what were, in the view of its supporters, its considerable
virtues.28
The aspiration to manage capitalism by means of state-sponsored reform
manifested in a very circumspect view of labor unions—particularly those
that embraced militancy and radicalism.29 Some Progressives not only
accepted the right of radical unions to exist but also, like the lawyer and
reformer Frank Walsh and like Roger Baldwin, the founder of the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), defended them politically and in court.30
However, most Progressives, including figures like Louis Brandeis and
Theodore Roosevelt, were skeptical about unions, particularly those with

24.

See DUBOFSKY, supra note 9, at 160-62 (discussing the IWW’s reputation for violence).
RICHARD WHITE, THE REPUBLIC FOR WHICH IT STANDS 216-17 (2017).
26. See PAUL D. MORENO, THE AMERICAN STATE FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO THE NEW DEAL: THE
TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE TRIUMPH OF PROGRESSIVISM (2013); BRADLEY C.S.
WATSON, PROGRESSIVISM: THE STRANGE HISTORY OF A RADICAL IDEA (2020).
27. MICHAEL MCGERR, A FIERCE DISCONTENT: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA xiv-xv, 70-71, 124-25 (2003).
28. See STORMQUIST, supra note 11, at 2-11 (2006); see also PEARSON, supra note 11; KOLKO,
supra note 11.
29. See PEARSON, supra note 11, at 64-78.
30. See id. at 58-62, 82-86, 105; Laura Weinrib, The Taming of Free Speech: America’s Civil
Liberties Compromise 183-99 (2016).
25.
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radical inclinations. A great majority of the movement’s adherents viewed
the IWW as a dubious organization, and many considered it an intolerable
menace. Similarly, while some Progressives’ suspicions about the power of
the state inspired their work in building this country’s first civil liberties
movement, most were broadly supportive of the use of force and violence as
means of governance and methods for advancing Progressivism’s social
vision.31
A prerequisite to implementing Progressives’ reformist program was
dispensing of force and violence in proper fashion, which is to say by the
state and in due accord with the law. This expressed itself in Progressivism’s
consistent support for the expansion of the police functions of the state,
meaning both increases in police and prosecutorial services and expansion of
the criminal law.32 It likewise took form in the movement’s campaign to
restructure the role of police and prosecutors around the norms of
professionalism and the rule of law.33 Armed with the power of law and the
state—and a legitimacy founded in its reformist critique of capitalism—the
movement emerged as a particularly potent adversary of the IWW and its
radical brand of industrial unionism.
II. THE RISE OF THE IWW, THE WAR, AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF
RADICAL INDUSTRIAL UNIONISM
For the first ten years of its existence, the IWW floundered. However,
its membership and influence grew substantially in the lead-up to America’s
entry into the First World War, due to a combination of better organizing and
greater demand for wartime labor. This growth was accompanied by
increased hostility towards the IWW, however, and the union’s antiwar
stance and embrace of “sabotage” as an instrument of protest anchored a
campaign of repression that culminated in the union being declared a criminal
organization.
A. The First World War and the IWW’s Rise
In the IWW’s early years, the union became involved in a number of
spectacular and violent struggles by insinuating itself into existing labor
disputes, including strikes by miners in Goldfield and Tonopah, Nevada, in
1906 and 1907; by steel workers in McKees Rocks, Pennsylvania, in 1909;
and by textile workers in Lawrence, Massachusetts, in 1912 and Paterson,

31.

See STORMQUIST, supra note 11, at 71-76.
JAY STUART BERMAN, POLICE ADMINISTRATION AND PROGRESSIVE REFORM 1-14 (1987).
33. SIDNEY L. HARRING, POLICING A CLASS SOCIETY: THE EXPERIENCE OF AMERICAN CITIES,
1865-1915, at 44-45 (1983); see Helen Boritch & John Hagan, Crime and the Changing Forms of Social
Control Policing Order in “Toronto the Good,” 1859-1955, 66 SOC. FORCES 307, 307-21 (1987).
32.
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New Jersey, in 1913.34 In some of the strikes, workers won concessions. But
these struggles generated no lasting gains. In fact, the union generally lost
membership, as the Western Federation of Miners withdrew over strategic
disputes and the IWW generally failed to recruit members of its own. So great
was this loss of support that, in the wake of the Paterson strike, enrollment,
which may have peaked at 60,000 in 1906, fell to somewhere between 10,000
and 30,000 by 1914.35
Between 1907 and 1917, the union famously led a number of “free
speech fights.”36 Set mainly in western cities, these were struggles by
Wobblies to vindicate their right to speak on the streets. The idea was to
respond to the arrests of its street-corner speakers by overwhelming the
authorities with more speakers to the point of that they could not jail them all
or honor their demands for jury trials. In the course of these affairs, it was
common for hundreds of Wobblies to get themselves packed into fetid jails
or confined for weeks in open-air “bullpens.” Reinforced by Ku Klux
Klansmen, local businessmen, and vigilantes, police often brutalized the
Wobblies.37 Many towns eventually conceded the Wobblies’ right to speak,
but only at great cost. Moreover, the fights did relatively little to advance the
union’s aim of recruiting migratory workers as they coursed through these
cities and sought employment on the streets.38
By 1914, the IWW failures had left it near collapse. But the union’s
fortunes took a turn, primarily because of some crucial changes in its
structure and strategies. In 1915, as labor demand surged in response to
global war, the IWW created a Migratory Labor Bureau. That year, it also
established a new union, the Agricultural Workers Organization (AWO)
dedicated to organizing migratory harvest workers, particularly those who
worked the wheat belt of the Great Plains. The IWW also replaced its existing
organizing scheme, which relied on stationary organizers and pre-set
bargaining terms, with a system that relied on “job delegates”—organizers
who stepped up from the workers’ own ranks—and gave them considerable
authority to decide how to recruit new members and bargain with employers.
Using this system, the AWO surged forward, claiming somewhere
between 16,000 and 20,000 members in its second year of existence.39
34.
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Renamed the Agricultural Workers Industrial Union, or AWIU, in March
1917, the union quickly became among the most stable and lucrative affiliate
in the IWW’s history.40 As the AWIU’s fortunes improved, so did those of
the entire IWW. In 1915, the IWW had a nationwide income of only $9,208
and essentially no cash on hand at its Chicago headquarters. The following
year, with 15 cents of every AWO member’s 50 cents in monthly dues going
straight to the IWW treasury, the union’s income was about $50,000 and its
cash balance reached nearly $19,000. Boosted by this income, in 1916 and
1917, the IWW created a number of other affiliated unions, including the
Lumber Workers Industrial Union (LWIU); the Metal Mine Workers
Industrial Union, of which there were several regional versions; the
Construction Workers Industrial Union; and the Oil Workers Industrial
Union. Each of these were focused on migratory workers, particularly in the
West; each embraced the job delegate system; and each set to work
expanding the union’s range and its influence amid wartime increases in
demand for material, construction, and labor. 41
Researchers have never developed an unproblematic way of determining
the exact level of membership in the IWW, not least because its ranks were
always so heavy with transient workers and its recordkeeping, which was
never good, was interrupted by government raids and prosecutions.42
Nevertheless, it is clear that the union’s membership surged in the lead-up to
America’s entry into the First World War: in early 1917, total IWW
membership reached roughly 150,000—and maybe quite a bit more than
this.43
Although the combination of war and better organizing rescued the
union from irrelevance, the union’s success stimulated a concerted campaign
to destroy it. At the center of this effort was the concept that figured so
prominently in Jesse Dunning’s prosecution in Bemidji—sabotage.
For years, especially from 1912 to 1917, the union’s characteristic
celebration of militancy and working-class potency was built around the
rhetoric of sabotage, which, in turn, defined the union in the eyes of its many
detractors. IWW newspapers and other publications repeatedly touted at least
some notion of sabotage, often accompanied by cartoon images of a wooden
shoe or pensive black cat; soapbox speakers regularly endorsed the concept;
and the union’s songs, fundamental to the cultivation of its identity, often
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celebrated sabotage.44 In fact, at the union’s ninth annual convention, in
September 1914, the IWW’s main governing body, its General Executive
Board, resolved “unanimously and without debate” that members should
recommend to fellow workers the tactics of “slowing down and sabotage” as
means of advancing the union’s goals.45
The term “sabotage” is probably rooted in nineteenth-century French
slang for inept, wooden-shoe-wearing strikebreakers of peasant origin. And
it originally contemplated a practice by which workers deliberately interfered
with production by working slowly or otherwise inefficiently. But by the time
the IWW was formed, sabotage already had a rival connotation, based in a
different etymology that located its roots in the overtly destructive practice
of throwing shoes into machinery.46
For those who opposed the IWW, the notion that it engaged in
destructive sabotage was both more threatening and more useful to their aim
to condemn the union as a seditious organization that endangered the war
effort and threatened the social order. In fact, some Wobblies did engage in
“destructive sabotage.” But among the union’s members, these incidents
were uncommon and they almost always involved minor acts, like disabling
machinery or burning a stack of wheat, rather than more serious and wonton
deeds.47 It was more common for Wobblies to practice sabotage in the older
sense of the word, by soldiering, playing dumb, following incorrect or
inefficient orders without question, or otherwise finding ways to “strike on
the job,” as the union put it.48 But the union’s growing list of enemies had
little interest in drawing fine distinctions. Even before the IWW’s resurgence,
let alone America’s entry into the war, the union’s preoccupation with
sabotage was becoming a sources of trouble.
A key event in this development was a largely spontaneous walkout by
terribly exploited hop pickers on a “ranch” in Wheatland, California. The
protest descended into a deadly riot which claimed the life of the local district
attorney and a deputy sheriff. There were only a few Wobblies among the
two thousand strikers, and there was no evidence that the union had anything
to do with the violence, which was largely provoked by the belligerent
44.
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actions of the ranch owner and the local authorities. Nevertheless, amid
sensational claims about widespread, IWW-sponsored sabotage in the region,
two men with ties to the IWW were convicted of murder in connection with
the riot and sentenced to life in prison.49
After the trial of the Wheatland defendants, there was indeed some
sabotage in California’s agricultural districts, mainly consisting of the
burning of crops and the poisoning of orchard trees. To the dismay of the
IWW’s leadership, which was awakening to the dangers of such rhetoric,
some union members in the area also circulated propaganda defending the
tactic.50 However, it seems that Wobblies were not responsible for much of
the destruction in the region, which could usually be attributed to accidents.
Moreover, to the extent there was sabotage, it seems quite likely that this was
mainly the work of various rogues, whether they belong to the union or not,
as well as provocateurs who had been enlisted to undermine the union.51
Nevertheless, the Wheatland affair and the events that followed
bolstered demands that the IWW be destroyed. A major force behind this was
the California Commission on Immigration and Housing, a powerful
institution that epitomized the contradictions of early twentieth-century
Progressivism. The commission was genuinely committed to improving
working and living conditions among the state’s growing population of
migratory workers. But it had no use for the IWW’s radicalism. In the wake
of the tumultuous events at Wheatland, the commission developed what one
historian has called an “obsession” with undermining the union. 52It
authorized itself to develop a plan for accomplishing this and served as
“coordinating agency” in the pursuit of that purpose.53
The affair also gave western governors, including California’s
Progressive governor Hiram Johnson, the justification they felt they needed
to enlist the federal government in the effort to dismantle the IWW. Prodded
by powerful business interests, the governors decided that the union was at
the center of a vast conspiracy, bent on the murder of government officials
as well as sabotage. Working through his Secretary of Interior, the governors
49. Cletus E. Daniel, In Defense of the Wheatland Wobblies A Critical Analysis of the IWW in
California, 19 LAB. HIST. 485, 489-95 (1978).
50. See Letter from John W. Preston, Special Assistant to the Att’y Gen. for War Work for the N.
Dist. of California, to Att’y Gen. (Apr. 29, 1919) (on file with National Archives, Washington D.C.,
General Records of the Department of Justice, General Correspondence, Record Group 60 and Records
of the Office of the Pardon Attorney, Record Group 204) (“[T]he Hop-Pickers Defense Committee . . .
advocated . . . all kinds of sabotage.”).
51. See Letter from U.S. Att’y, Dist. of Nebraska, to Att’y Gen. (Apr. 10, 1919) (on file with
National Archives, Washington D.C., General Records of the Department of Justice, General
Correspondence, Record Group 60 and Records of the Office of the Pardon Attorney, Record Group 204)
(“Among the number indicted there are only three or four that were active in the organization.”).
52. CHESTER, supra note 9, at 11.
53. Id. at 11, 15, 133; see also GREG HALL, HARVEST WOBBLIES: THE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF
THE WORLD AND AGRICULTURAL LABORERS IN THE AMERICAN WEST, 1905-1930, at 48-54 (2001).
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urged President Wilson to institute a campaign of federal repression directed
against the union. They were aided in this effort by the Commission on
Immigration and Housing, which dispatched officers to Washington to lobby
Wilson.54
These efforts initially failed. Short on enforcement resources, Justice
Department officials preferred, for the time being, to leave the IWW problem
in the hands of state and local officials.55 But as America worked its way into
the war, and as the power of the federal government grew, the idea that
federal officials should help destroy the IWW was incorporated into a
growing program of militarism and jingoism. The cornerstone of this
development was the claim that the IWW was an agent of Imperial Germany.
Probably conceived by the United States Attorney of Oregon, this charge was
never backed by any real evidence. Nevertheless, it was embraced by the
Department of Justice, aggressively propagated by western congressmen and
business interests, and breathlessly recounted in newspapers all over the
country.56
Early in the decade, the IWW had denounced the war as a senseless
waste of workers’ lives in the pursuit of imperialist and capitalist interests.57
At its 1916 convention, the IWW had resolved that members should agitate
against the war during peacetime and launch a general strike should the
United States enter the conflict.58 Although these antiwar positions were
widely endorsed by the rank-and-file, when America’s entry into the war
became more certain, IWW leaders found themselves at odds about what to
do. Some, including William “Big Bill” Haywood, the IWW’s generalsecretary treasurer and foremost leader though this key period in its history,
thought it wise for the union to tone down its opposition to war, especially
once the United States formally entered the conflict on April 6, 1917. Others,
though, continued to urge active, though peaceful, resistance. An attempt by
the union’s five-member Executive Board to resolve this disagreement was
unsuccessful and members were left to decide for themselves whether to
dodge the draft or openly oppose the war.59
In the meantime, President Wilson had renounced his earlier opposition
to the war and had begun to aggressively promote America’s entry as
something essential to securing the peace and realizing Progressive values.
Wilson’s position was consistent with the spirit of nationalism and militarism
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that inhered in Progressivism’s endorsement of a disciplined, unified, and
well-managed society that transcended class conflict, enforced a sense of
social solidarity, and embraced a functional system of social control.
Wilson’s stance was also consistent with the immediate interests of the AFL
and the mainstream labor movement, whose supporters within the
Progressive movement increasingly viewed the war as “an opportunity” to
improve wages and increase regulation of economic production and labor
relations.60
B. Legislative Responses and the Criminalization of the IWW
The Progressive movement’s increasing support for America’s formal
entry into the war not only heightened its conflict with the IWW but also put
it at the center of an effort to enact legislation that could be used to crush the
union. Proceeding at both state and federal levels, this campaign made
effective use of the union’s association with “sabotage” and its unfounded
reputation for sedition and criminality. This rhetoric concealed the
campaign’s deeper basis in furthering the aims of powerful capitalists, whose
interests lay in destroying the organization regardless of the particular
concerns articulated about war and criminal acts in and about the workplace.
1. Federal Legislation
Repressive legislation geared towards criminalizing radical unionism
included several bills that eventually became the Espionage Act. Drafted
mainly by a Progressive legal scholar named Charles Warren, who was then
serving as an assistant attorney general, this new legislation dealt with
everything from the issuance of passports, to export controls and the proper
conduct of diplomacy. But it also anticipated the prosecution of the IWW and
other radicals on the grounds that they were interfering with the war effort.
The key provisions in this regard were Section 3 of Title I, which made it a
felony for anyone to “willfully make or convey false reports” with intent to
interfere with the military, to “wilfully [sic] cause or attempt to cause
insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, refusal of duty” in the military, or to
“wilfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States”;
and Section 4 of that title, which made it a felony to conspire to violate
Section 3.61
Despite the Act’s emphasis on safeguarding military mobilization, there
seemed to be little doubt in Congress that Title I would also be enforced in a
way that would impinge on the rights of free speech and association—the
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rights of radicals in particular.62 Some in Congress, including both
conservatives and Progressives, viewed these provisions as affronts to the
principles on which the country stood, and therefore opposed the bill. 63But
even Progressives who worried over the new legislation’s draconian
implications tended to take for granted that it should be used to rein in the
IWW, along with other leftists.64 Moreover, nearly all of the debate in
Congress about the Espionage Act concerned provisions other than Title I.65
None of this debate amounted to much, at least not so far as the ultimate
fate of the legislation was concerned. The House passed its bill by a margin
of 259 to 107 and the Senate approved its version by a vote of 77 to 6. The
bills were reconciled via a conference report, and the new statute, the
Espionage Act, was signed into law by Wilson on June 15, 1917.66
2. State and Local Legislation
Beginning in early 1917, twenty-one states, two territories, and several
localities also moved to criminalize the IWW by enacting criminal
syndicalism laws. Idaho was the first. As one Idaho state senator recalled, the
impetus came from “the better class of citizens” who required “some kind of
legislation that would give protection to parties investing their money in
business enterprises in the State.”67 Worried about increasing IWW activism
in lumber, which was, as the bill took shape, leading to the formation of the
LWIU, the coalition left little to chance. It drafted six bills that sought, in one
way or another, to criminalize radicalism and union activism.68
Introduced in February 1917, most of this legislation went nowhere, in
part because of resistance from AFL unionists and their allies who worried
how such laws might affect them. The exception was a bill conceived to
prohibit membership in radical groups and to bar the advocacy of radical
activity. This bill gained a hearing but was met with skepticism by the state’s
senate judiciary committee, whose staff considered it overly broad and
ambiguous and yet also “inadequate to accomplish the avowed purpose.”69
But that purpose was viewed in a positive way by many in the legislature, so
the bill’s champions sought help from a Boise lawyer named Benjamin
Walker Oppenheim. For the purpose of rewriting the law, Oppenheim may
62. Rabban, supra note 61, at 1217-23; see also H.R. 291, 55th Cong. (1917); S. 2, 55th Cong.
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have consulted a 1916 Australian sedition law that criminalized IWW
agitation against the war as well as criminal anarchy statutes adopted by
Wisconsin and New York in the wake of the 1901 assassination of William
McKinley. Oppenheim did not copy these other statutes, though; instead he
produced a bill that was specifically designed to make membership in IWW
and support for its brand of “revolutionary industrial unionism” a felony.70
Oppenheim’s bill was approved in the state house by a vote of 60 to 0
and it cleared the senate by a vote of 32 to 3.71 There was little discussion of
the bill on the floor, beyond many scathingly anti-IWW speeches
accompanied by the distribution of printed copies of IWW literature.72 On
March 14, 1917, a little less than a month after it had been introduced—and
about a week after the formation of the LWIU just over the border in
Spokane, Washington—the statute received final approval.73
The first section of Idaho’s new law defined criminal syndicalism as “the
doctrine which advocates crime, sabotage, violence or unlawful methods of
terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform” and
declared “advocacy of such doctrine, whether by word of mouth or writing”
a felony.74 The second section of the law then defined the crime in more
detail, making it a felony, punishable by up to ten years in prison and a fine
of $5,000, for a person to engage in any of an array of unlawful conduct,
including written or oral advocacy of “industrial or political reform” through
“crime, sabotage, violence or other unlawful methods of terrorism” or
membership in an organization committed to criminal syndicalism.75 Another
section of the statute made it a felony, punishable by ten years in prison and
a $5,000 fine, for two or more people to “assemble for the purpose of
advocating or teaching the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.” Yet another
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provision made it a misdemeanor for any “owner, agent, superintendent,
janitor, caretaker, or occupant of any place” to knowingly allow it to be used
for such an assemblage.76
Other states soon followed suit. The law under which Jesse Dunning was
prosecuted in Minnesota was enacted in the spring of 1917, just after Idaho’s.
Pushed by lumber and mining interests, it was adopted with little
opposition.77 Between the beginning of 1918 and the end of 1920, nineteen
other states and two territories, including nearly every jurisdiction west of the
Mississippi, had adopted criminal syndicalism laws.78 Every one of these
jurisdictions defined the crime in accordance with the basic concept that
advocacy of industrial or political reform by means of crime, sabotage,
violence, or terrorism was prohibited. Most, in fact, were essentially copies
of the Idaho law, with variation only in the severity of punishment. Although
localized animus to other unions was sometimes a factor, most of these laws
were aimed primarily at undermining the IWW.
As historian Eldridge Dowell observes, criminal syndicalism laws were
enacted exactly where the IWW had led or was leading contentious strikes in
copper, coal, iron, oil, wheat, fruit and vegetables, shipping, and lumber.79 In
every state that adopted such a law, the political system was broadly
dominated by industrial capitalists, as well as “the middle classes, the
professional groups, and the large farmers”—in other words, the key
constituents of Progressivism—who were all largely committed to
“legislating against the unskilled and property less migratory laborer.”80 In
six states as well as in Alaska and Hawaii, syndicalism laws were enacted
without a single dissenting vote; in eleven other states, there was unanimity
of support in at least one house of the legislature.81 In this context,
“opposition to or support of the criminal syndicalism laws cannot be
explained in terms of political parties,” as Dowell observed. Rather,
“economic interests” determined legislators’ positions on this issue, with the
only consistent opposition to the enactment of criminal syndicalism laws
coming from the small number of Socialist Party and Progressive
legislators.82 For the most part, Republicans and Democrats joined together
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in supporting these laws, lining up to fulminate from assembly floors and
committee rooms about the many dangers supposedly posed by the IWW.83
But not all Progressives were prepared to sacrifice liberal principles to
the project of destroying the IWW. In Washington, a bill supported by lumber
and agricultural interests commanded huge majorities in both houses of the
legislature. However, Governor Ernest Lister vetoed the bill, though he was
hardly an IWW supporter.84 Lister was not alone among governors in
opposing this kind of legislation; Arizona governor W.P. Hunt did as well,
albeit to no avail.85
It says much about the politics that gave rise to the criminal syndicalism
laws that they were frequently enacted not only with broad support from
Progressives but also with the support of AFL unionists, and alongside bills
that instituted significant labor reforms. In the same session in which it
enacted its criminal syndicalism law, the Idaho legislature enacted important
laws on mine safety.86 Utah enacted its criminal syndicalism law
simultaneous with an eight-hour-a-day law for women workers.87 When, in
1919, the Washington legislature overrode Governor Lister’s veto and
enacted a criminal syndicalism law, it approved legislation aimed at
preventing workplace accidents, increasing compensation for workplace
injuries and protecting the right of workers to picket.88 Likewise, California,
which would lead the country in the enforcement of its criminal syndicalism
law, passed a criminal syndicalism law alongside “scores of measures
advocated by organized labor.”89
State legislatures were not the only bodies to adopt criminal syndicalism
laws. In Washington, over twenty cities, including Seattle, Spokane, and
Olympia, enacted such laws.90 In Seattle and Spokane, the ordinances were
near carbon copies of the main state-level statutes. As city ordinances,
however, they could only impose misdemeanor liability. For instance, the
Spokane ordinance contemplated up to thirty days in jail and fines of up to
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and Los Angeles, 1870-1940, 55 PAC. HIST. REV. 371, 381, 393-95 (1986).
90. 4 AM. LAB. YEARBOOK 1921-1922, at 10 (Alexander Trachtenberg & Benjamin Glassberg eds.,
1963); Council Has Busy Time this Week, WASH. STANDARD (Olympia), May 10, 1918, at 1.
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$100.91 Other municipalities to enact such laws include Wichita, Kansas;
Baker and Saint Helens, Oregon; Tucson, Arizona; and Duluth, Minnesota.92
III. PROSECUTING THE IWW
On the afternoon of September 5, 1917, scores of Justice Department
officials, aided by local police and vigilantes, raided nearly fifty IWW offices
across the country. They seized tons of material, including membership
books, meeting records, letters, typewriters and other office equipment, as
well as intimate personal letters and other property.93 These raids, along with
Dunning’s arrest on syndicalism charges just a few weeks earlier, signaled
the beginning of a broad-ranging campaign to use the newly enacted
antiradical laws to destroy the IWW. As a review of its key features shows,
this campaign made use of both federal and state prosecutions and it extended
well beyond the war and the Red Scare.
A. Federal Prosecutions
The raids of September 5 inaugurated an extraordinary wave of federal
arrests and prosecutions that would ensnare hundreds of Wobblies and put
many of them in prison. More raids followed through September and later
into the fall, as did a raft of indictments. Within days of sacking the union’s
headquarters on the city’s West Side, federal prosecutors in Chicago had
indicted 166 IWW members, including most of the union’s top leadership.94
Among these were not only Big Bill Haywood, but Ralph Chaplin, author of
the labor ballad, “Solidarity Forever”; Ben Fletcher, the most prominent
black man in the IWW and a leader of its dockworkers’ union; and James
Rowan, a major figure in the union’s organizing efforts in lumber and wheat.
About 100 other Wobblies were indicted on similar charges by authorities in
Sacramento, Fresno, Omaha, and Wichita.95
The federal raids and indictments were the result of a conspiracy of
powerful people to destroy the union, at the head of which were Progressives
who wielded considerable influence with Wilson and his Justice Department.
They included Simon Lubin, who headed the California Commission on

91.

Dowell, supra note 3, at 224.
Dowell, supra note 3 at 185-86; Proceedings of the City Council, ST. HELENS MIST (Olympia),
Jun. 14, 1918, at 1; Criminal Syndicalism Made Misdemeanor by New Tucson Ordinance, ARIZ. REPUBLIC
(Phoenix), Aug. 9, 1923, at 10; I.W.W. Ordinance, WICHITA DAILY EAGLE, July 31, 1920, at 5.
93. DUBOFSKY, supra note 9, at 406; Philip Taft, The Federal Trials of the IWW, 3 LAB. HIST. 60,
60-61 (1962); Property to be Returned to Defendants, United States v. Wm. D. Haywood et al., No. 6215
(N.D. Ill. 1917) (on file with Walter Reuther Memorial Library, Fred Thompson Collection, Box 11,
Folder 15); Order, United States v. Wm. D. Haywood et al., No. 6215 (N.D. Ill. 1917) (on file with Walter
Reuther Memorial Library, Fred Thompson Collection, Box 11, Folder 15).
94. DUBOFSKY, supra note 9, at 443.
95. Taft, supra note 93, at 57; DUBOFSKY, supra note 9, at 437; CHESTER, supra note 9 at 221.
92.
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Immigration and Housing, and John Lind, a Progressive Democrat and
former governor of Minnesota who headed the state’s Public Safety
Commission.96 Newspapers also supported the raids and the indictments. In
the view of the Minneapolis Tribune, for instance, the guilt of the IWW
“traitors” as agents of Germany was fully confirmed by the raids alone.97 For
the Washington Post, the raids and the indictments were “an excellent start.”98
“This snake should be scotched . . . Let its existence end at Chicago where
its crushing may teach a salutary lesson in militant patriotism,” the paper
said.99 Even the liberal St. Louis Post-Dispatch averred that the union had
“gone a step too far” and now faced a proper reckoning.100
The Chicago case became the largest of three mass prosecutions of
Wobblies by federal authorities. Like the other cases, the Chicago
prosecution was anchored in the Espionage Act but also featured charges
based in other statutes. Count one alleged that the defendants had violated a
general provision of the federal code by conspiring to use force to impede the
execution of ten federal statutes, including the Espionage Act, as well as
several presidential proclamations related to war production.101 Count two,
which also rested on a general conspiracy provision in the federal code,
alleged that the defendants had conspired to deprive businesses engaged in
war production of their constitutional right to fulfill their contractual
obligations.102 Counts three and four both charged the defendants with
conspiring to undermine the Selective Draft Act.103 While count three rested
on a general provision in the federal code, count four invoked section 4 of
the Espionage Act, the conspiracy provision.104 According to the indictment,

96. See Letter from Simon J. Lubin, Comm’r, State Comm’n of Immigr. and Hous. of Cal., to
Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States (Apr. 10, 1918) (on file with National Archives,
Washington D.C., General Records of the Department of Justice, General Correspondence, Record Group
60 and Records of the Office of the Pardon Attorney, Record Group 204); Letter from Simon J. Lubin,
Comm’r, State Comm’n of Immigr. and Hous. of Cal., to T. W. Gregory, Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just. (Apr.
10, 1918) (on file with National Archives, Washington D.C., General Records of the Department of
Justice, General Correspondence, Record Group 60 and Records of the Office of the Pardon Attorney,
Record Group 204); Letter from Woodrow Wilson to T. W. Gregory, supra note 9; CHESTER, supra note
9, at 165-66, 194; DUBOFSKY, supra note 9, at 393-97; OLMSTED, supra note 9, at 122, 124.
97. The I.W.W. Traitors, MINNEAPOLIS MORNING TRIB., Oct. 3, 1917, at 6.
98. Scotch the Snake, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 1917, at S4.
99. Id.
100. Putting Down the I.W.W., ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 7, 1917, at 20.
101. Philip S. Foner, United States of America vs. Wm. D. Haywood, et al. The I.W.W. Indictment,
11 LAB. HIST. 500, 506-24 (1970).
102. Id. at 524-25.
103. Id. at 525-27; Selective Draft Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-12, ch.15, 40 Stat. 76.
104. A fifth count involved conspiring to defraud employers who had hired defense workers.
However, it had little bearing on the case and was withdrawn during the trial. See Foner, supra note 101,
at 528-30.
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the overt acts common to all these conspiracies consisted only of statements,
articles, policy declarations, and other verbal utterances.105
The Chicago defendants were brought to trial on April 1, 1918 before an
interesting figure: future Commissioner of Baseball, Judge Kennesaw
Mountain Landis. A pro-war Progressive, Landis made a great show of how
fair he was during the proceedings. But he allowed prosecutors to deluge the
jury with mountains of inflammatory and often perjured testimony which
charged the union with conspiring to undermine the war effort by means of a
series of strikes and sabotage concentrated in mining and lumber in the West,
and by propaganda and other inducements to men not to submit to the draft.106
There was, in fact, very little proof of any of this and much to suggest that
the whole narrative was entirely false. Nevertheless, after four months of trial
that featured a vigorous defense, the jury took less than an hour to convict
100 defendants on over 400 separate counts.107
On August 31, Landis sentenced the defendants. He released several
defendants, ordered several others to serve brief jail terms, and sentenced
twelve defendants to a year in prison. Then, really getting down to business,
he sentenced thirty-five defendants to five years in prison; thirty-three to ten
years; and fifteen, including Haywood, Chaplin, Rowan, and other top
leaders, to the maximum term of twenty years.108
The defendants in the Sacramento case were brought to trial in
December 1918, after months of confinement with inadequate food amid a
global influenza pandemic that had already killed four of them. Although the
forty-six who made it to trial were mostly rank-and-file members and local
organizers, their numbers included several members of the union’s Defense
Committee. Police raided the committee’s San Francisco office seven times
over a six-month period, seized all the office’s documents, and, on fifteen
separate occasions, arrested the secretary of the defense committee.
Government agents also resorted to false pretenses to intercept union
correspondence and uncover details about their cases.109
Convinced that it would be futile to mount a conventional defense, fortythree of the Sacramento defendants declined to engage counsel and opted for
a “silent defense.” In this case, too, the evidence put on by the government
was inflammatory, prejudicial, and altogether unfounded: it consisted of
union literature and correspondence as well as the testimony of no fewer than

105.

Id. at 505.
See Taft, supra note 93, at 62-69.
107. Id. at 74; CHESTER, supra note 9, at 178, 184-85.
108. All of the defendants who were sentenced to prison were also subject to heavy fines of up to
$30,000 each. Taft, supra note 93, at 74-75; CHESTER, supra note 9, at 184-85; DUBOFSKY, supra note 9
at 437; Haywood Given 20 Year Term; 93 Sentenced, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Aug. 31, 1918, at 1.
109. See Hyman Weintraub, The I.W.W. in California: 1905-1931, at 148-50 (Feb. 1947) (M.A.
thesis, University of California, Los Angeles) (on file with author); CHESTER, supra note 9, at 197.
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five IWW turncoats, including two thoroughly disreputable “professional
witnesses,” John Dymond and Elbert Coutts.110 Presented with this evidence,
the jury deliberated for just over an hour before convicting every one of the
defendants.111 On January 17, 1919, Judge Frank Rudkin sent the forty-three
silent defenders to prison for terms ranging from one to ten years, with more
than half of them getting ten years. Three other defendants received lighter
sentences.
Federal prosecutors in Wichita needed three indictments before finally
indicting over two-dozen Wobblies on charges of violating the Espionage
Act, as well as the Lever Act of 1917, which provided for the regulation of
wartime fuel and food resources, and a separate federal statute which
criminalized seditious conspiracy. For the better part of two years, these
defendants languished in dirty, unsanitary jails in and around Wichita,
making do with unhealthy foods and dank and rat-infested lodgings.112
Apprised of these conditions, Judge John Pollock moved the defendants and
the case to Kansas City. But by the time trial finally opened there on
December 1, 1919, one defendant had died, two had developed mental
illnesses, and others suffered from tuberculosis, scarlet fever, typhoid, and
influenza.113
There was no evidence that any of these defendants had entered into any
kind of criminal conspiracies. It was for this reason that prosecutors’
arguments in this case were particularly focused on proving that the IWW
itself was a seditious organization, and that mere membership in the union
was therefore tantamount to engaging in a criminal conspiracy. To this end,
prosecutors relied very much on the testimony of former IWW members,
including Coutts and Dymond.114 These witnesses insisted to the jury that the
IWW was committed to undermining war production and the draft by means
of violence and sabotage, and that the defendants, being members of the
IWW, had thereby conspired to achieve such criminal ends. On December
18, 1919, the jury signaled its agreement, convicting every one of the twenty110. See, e.g., Letter from John Murray to E.J. Costello (July 21, 1921) (on file with Princeton
University, Mudd Library, The Roger Baldwin Years, 1912-1950, Correspondence-General: Amnesty:
Political Prisoners, Vol. 198); Dowell, supra note 3, at 345.
111. CHESTER, supra note 9, at 197-200; WILLIAM PRESTON JR., ALIENS AND DISSENTERS: FEDERAL
SUPPRESSION OF RADICALS, 1903-1933, at 135 (1963); see also ACLU, Various Correspondence
Regarding the IWW (1918) (on file with Princeton University, Mudd Library, The Roger Baldwin Years,
1912-1950, Correspondence-General: Industrial Workers of the World Vol. 86 at 42-145); Weintraub,
supra note 109 at 156.
112. Clayton R. Koppes, The Kansas Trial of the IWW, 1917-1919, 16 LAB. HIST. 338, 348 (1975).
113. SELLARS, supra note 46, at 114; see also Letter from Thomas Whitehead, Acting Sec’y Gen.,
Indus. Workers of the World, to Albert DeSilver, Nat’l Civ. Liberties Bureau (Mar. 25, 1919) (on file with
Princeton University, Mudd Library, The Roger Baldwin Years, 1912-1950, Correspondence-General:
Industrial Workers of The World Cases, Vol. 86) (“Those who were taken to Topeka County Jail are on a
hunger strike on account of the food conditions.”).
114. Coutts’ appearance was cut short by his inability to offer any relevant evidence. Koppes, supra
note 112 at 352-53.
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seven defendants who made it to trial.115 That same day, Pollock sent all but
one of the defendants to prison to serve sentences that ranged from one to
nine years.116
Not every group of Wobblies charged with violating the Espionage Act
was convicted, though. The sixty-four Wobblies arrested by federal
authorities in Omaha in November 1917 languished in jail for eighteen
months. But they were never prosecuted.117 In April 1919, the local United
States Attorney, who had repeatedly expressed his doubts about the case, first
to Attorney General Thomas Gregory, then to Gregory’s successor, A.
Mitchell Palmer, brokered their unconditional release.118
B. State Prosecutions
What these Wobblies experienced at the hands of federal authorities was
matched by the treatment they received from state officials across a number
of western jurisdictions. An early example is the case of J.J. McMurphy, who
was convicted of criminal syndicalism in Wallace, Idaho, in Shoshone
County, on October 23, 1917. Picked up after giving a speech promoting the
IWW, McMurphy was found to possess a good deal of union literature,
including one of the books on sabotage that had helped get Jesse Dunning
convicted of criminal syndicalism just a couple of weeks earlier in
Minnesota. McMurphy sat mostly silent during the proceedings. He waited
until he was being sentenced to a year at hard labor plus a $500 fine to unleash
on the court what an area newspaper called the “fevered battle cries” of the
IWW.119
McMurphy’s conviction was the first of thirty criminal syndicalism
convictions in Idaho between 1917 and 1923. Every one of these convictions
involved IWW members.120 Most defendants were picked up either in the

115. Id. at 343; see also Transcript of Trial at 1076, United States v. Anderson, No. 763 (D. Kan.
1919) (on file with National Archives, Washington D.C., General Records of the Department of Justice,
General Correspondence, Record Group 60 and Records of the Office of the Pardon Attorney, Record
Group 204); Dowell, supra note 3, at 646. Philip Taft reports that twenty-seven defendants were convicted.
Taft, supra note 93, at 79-80.
116. ACLU, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE I.W.W. PRISONERS 24 (1922); Taft, supra note 93, at 79-80.
117. Memorandum entitled “I.W.W. Matters,” to Chicago Office (Dec. 28, 1917) (on file with
National Archives, Washington D.C., General Records of the Department of Justice, General
Correspondence, Record Group 60); DUBOFSKY, supra note 9, at 442-43; David Wagaman, The Industrial
Workers of the World in Nebraska, 1914-1920, 56 Neb. History, 295, 315, 320, 322 (1975).
118. Letters from T.S. Allen to Att’y Gen. (June 29, 1918, Apr. 10, 1919) (on file with National
Archives, Washington D.C., General Records of the Department of Justice, General Correspondence,
Record Group 60 and Records of the Office of the Pardon Attorney, Record Group 204)); DUBOFSKY,
supra note 9, at 442-43.
119. Syndicalism Law Secures its First Victim, EVENING CAP. NEWS, Oct. 24, 1917, at 5; Description
of Convict, State Penitentiary, Boise, Idaho (Nov. 20, 1917) (on file with Idaho State Archives, Inmate
Records, Records of J.J. McMurphy).
120. On extent of military intervention, see generally PRESTON, supra note 111.
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course of union-led strikes in the state’s lumber producing districts or
because they had been identified as job delegates.121 As was usually the case,
all of the defendants were men; and all of these men, including McMurphy,
served time in the Idaho State Penitentiary.122
The conviction of Wobbly A.S. Embree is also illustrative of how these
cases unfolded in Idaho.123 Embree was a key organizer with the IWW who
emerged as an important figure in the union after the federal raids and
prosecutions depleted its leadership.124 Embree was arrested in Burke, Idaho
in late May 1920 by the high sheriff, who recognized Embree from his recent
appearance at another criminal syndical trial, searched him, and discovered a
number of IWW documents in his possession.125
Embree’s trial featured testimony from various sheriff’s deputies, who
professed to be experts on IWW literature, and a special agent from the U.S.
Department of Justice, who attested to the union’s seditious character. The
prosecution’s case also relied on two IWW turncoats.126 None of these
witnesses’ testimony proved anything except that Embree was an organizer
and that the IWW was active in the region. But as was typical in these cases,
this did not matter—or, rather, this is all that did matter. After a week of trial,
the jury convicted Embree. He was sentenced to one-to-ten years in prison
and delivered to the penitentiary just over a week later.127
What happened in Idaho was a portent of how criminal syndicalism laws
would be used against Wobblies in other western states. In Oregon, the
IWW’s fate was shaped by a broader upsurge of radicalism which culminated
in the January 1919 formation of a “Council of Workers, Soldiers and Sailors
of Portland and Vicinity.” The “Portland Soviet,” as it was generally called,
was by no means a creature of the IWW; leftists and unionists of many stripes
participated. But it was strongly influenced by and associated with area
Wobblies.128 Its emergence made the enactment of a statewide criminal
121. See, e.g., Labor Agitator is Guilty, OREGONIAN, Oct. 27, 1917, at 6; Labor Agitator is Received
at the Penitentiary, EVENING CAPITAL NEWS (Boise, ID), Nov. 15, 1917, at 7.
122. See generally Idaho State Archives, Idaho Penitentiary Inmates Catalog (1864-1947) (Inmate
Records).
123. See Hugh T. Lovin, Idaho and the “Reds,” 1919-1926, 69 PAC. NW. Q. 107, 111 (1978).
124. See Record of Conviction, Idaho v. Embree, No. 1021 (1st Dist. Ct. Idaho 1921) (on file with
Idaho State Archives, Inmate Records, Records of A.S. Embree); Letter from Prosecuting Att’y to Bd. of
Prison Comm’rs. (June 1, 1921) (on file with Idaho State Archives, Inmate Records, Records of A.S.
Embree).
125. Transcript of Trial at 4-8, Idaho v. Embree, No. 1021 (1st Dist. Ct. Idaho 1921) (on file with
Idaho State Archives, Inmate Records, Records of A.S. Embree); Tragical Ending of Syndicalist Case,
INDUS. WORKER, Jun. 5, 1920, at 1.
126. See Transcript of Trial, supra note 125, at 4-123.
127. Description of Convict, State Penitentiary, Boise, Idaho (June 1, 1921) (on file with Idaho State
Archives, Inmate Records, Records of A.S. Embree).
128. See Dowell, supra note 3, at 552-53; see generally Adam Hodges, Thinking Globally, Acting
Locally The Portland Soviet and the Emergence of American Communism, 1918-1920, 98 PAC. NW. Q.
116 (2007).
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syndicalism law early that February inevitable. Prodded by business interests,
the legislature passed the law with little dissent, alongside a suite of
progressive laws, including statutes that established a statewide
compensation system and limited the use of injunctions against unions.129
Within a week of the enactment of Oregon’s criminal syndicalism law,
Portland police decreed it unlawful for anyone to distribute radical literature
on the streets and promptly arrested nine Socialists and IWWs.130 Within a
month, both the union and the Portland Soviet had been evicted from their
headquarters by landlords who feared being charged with criminal
syndicalism.131 Other arrests for criminal syndicalism followed.132 Some of
these occurred in small towns.133 But many originated in Portland, where
scores of Wobblies were taken into custody and where the union claimed that,
from November 1919 through January 1920, more than two dozen of its
members were either facing criminal syndicalism charges or had already been
convicted of the crime.134
This surge in arrests and prosecutions continued through 1919 and into
the following year.135 On July 10, 1920 the IWW published a list of pending
criminal cases in the region. The document described a number of criminal
syndicalism convictions in Oregon and noted that thirty-one members were
still under indictment in the state.136 Most of these cases were in Portland and
almost all involved Wobblies. However, there were also prosecutions in
Tillamook, Klamath Falls, and Condon Falls, and some Socialists and
members of the nascent Communist movement were among the
defendants.137 These cases accounted for some of the 200 or more people,
nearly all of them IWWs, who were formally charged with criminal
129.
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131. See Hodges, supra note 128, at 124-25.
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1919, at 4.
136. Northwest Defense Bulletin, INDUS. WORKER, July 10, 1920, at 1.
137. Northwest Defense Bulletin, INDUS. WORKER, June 5, 1920, at 1; Northwest Defense Bulletin,
INDUS. WORKER, Feb. 14, 1920, at 1; see also Letter from Ernest G. Swigert, Elec. Steel Foundry, to Am.
Civ. Liberties Union (June 18, 1920) (on file with Princeton University, Mudd Library, The Roger
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syndicalism in Oregon in the two or three years after the law was enacted.138
By 1922, enforcement in the state had decreased significantly, but there
continued to be scattered arrests through that year and into the next.139
In Washington, enforcement followed a similar course. Events were
framed not only by longstanding IWW activism in lumber and farming, but
also trouble in Seattle, where activism centered on the waterfront gave rise in
February 1919 to the Seattle General Strike. The strike’s organizers, whose
ranks included IWW members, communists of various factions, militant AFL
unionists, and disaffected war veterans, managed to maintain order and
essential services, despite otherwise bringing commerce in the city to a
standstill. But the strike presented an opportunity for Seattle’s Progressive
mayor, Ole Hanson, to fulminate about the risks of radicalism and the IWW
in particular, fill the streets with police and military personnel, and help bring
the strike to an end.140
There was plenty of appetite among Hanson and his allies to throw those
who were behind this unrest, especially the IWWs among them, into prison.
But Washington’s new criminal syndicalism statute did not go into effect
until June. In February, authorities in Seattle therefore charged two dozen
Wobblies with criminal anarchy.141 However, despite an array of government
agents and informants and breathless depictions of radical literature typical
of nearly all antiradical prosecutions, the jury acquitted the first of these
defendants to be brought to trial, a man named James Bruce. Prosecutors then
dismissed charges against the other defendants.142
Meanwhile, authorities in Spokane aggressively enforced their city’s
misdemeanor criminal syndicalism law. In January 1919, police raided the
IWW’s new hall, tore up the place, took six Wobblies into custody, and
charged five with criminal syndicalism. A week later, these defendants were
convicted and sentenced to thirty days and a $100 fine.143 Through the spring
and into the summer, more arrests followed.144 In July, fourteen Wobblies
138.
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were arrested at the trial of the union’s secretary on vagrancy and
misdemeanor criminal syndicalism charges, because they were wearing
IWW buttons.145 The very next day, seven more Wobblies were arrested for
wearing buttons and this time charged with violating the new state criminal
syndicalism law.146
These were not the only occasions when Wobblies were arrested for
supporting each other in court. In November 1921, three Wobblies were
indicted on criminal syndicalism charges because they either attended or gave
testimony at a criminal syndicalism trial in Los Angeles and, for this, were
included in a group of eight convicted of criminal syndicalism the following
year.147 In the summer of 1922 a judge in Eureka, California, determined that
a young Wobbly, who was the secretary of the union’s LWIU local and had
been arrested for attending the trial of another Wobbly, was guilty of criminal
syndicalism and committed him to reform school.148 Likewise, on September
13, 1923, five IWW members were convicted and sentenced to prison after
being arrested upon leaving the witness stand during a criminal syndicalism
trial in Sacramento, California, in late June of that year.149
Meanwhile, arrests and prosecutions continued in Washington. In
August 1919, union officials in Spokane dispatched an urgent telegram
warning that “many arrests” of members on criminal syndicalism charges
were occurring in and around Spokane.150 In November of that year, a union
newspaper reported that “[f]or the past week raid after raid on rooming
houses, hotel[s] and pool rooms have taken place,” resulting in approximately
120 arrests and 53 members being charged with violating the city’s criminal
syndicalism ordinance. In mid-November, these 53 men were tried,
convicted, and then sentenced to thirty days in jail and fined $100.151
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California Prison and Correctional Records, San Quentin State Prison, Book No. 10, Inmate No. 36502;
California Prison and Correctional Records, Folsom State Prison, Inmate No. 12540.
148. California Has First Minor in Political Case, N.Y. CALL, July 31, 1922 (on file with Princeton
University, Mudd Library, the Roger Baldwin Years, 1912-1950 Collection, Correspondence-Cases by
State: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Idaho Vol. 208 at 34).
149. IWW GEN. DEF. COMM., PHOTOSTAT OF DIGEST OF CRIMINAL SYNDICALISM CASES 51 (1926)
(on file with University of Michigan, Manuscript Collection, Ralph Chaplin Papers, 1909-1948, Box 1).
150. Many Arrests in Spokane District, INDUS. WORKER, Aug. 23, 1919, at 1.
151. Convict 53 I.W.W. of Syndicalism, INDUS. WORKER, Nov. 29, 1919, at 1. On prosecutions under
the city’s ordinance, see also Letter from Albert Streieff to ACLU (Feb. 14, 1919) (on file with Princeton
University, Mudd Library, ACLU Papers, The Roger Baldwin Years, 1912-1950, CorrespondenceGeneral: Industrial Workers of the World Cases, Vol. 86 at 198).
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In mid-January 1920, Spokane authorities prosecuted forty IWWs at
once on municipal criminal syndicalism charges. These forty defendants
were ultimately acquitted, but only after experiencing great difficulty
acquiring legal representation.152 This was not an uncommon problem, in
part, because the lawyers who dared represent the defendants faced real risks.
For instance, in June 1918, a lawyer named Edward Hofstede was disbarred
in Washington on account of his earlier conviction on the dubious charge of
counseling others not to register for the draft—for which he served some
months in prison. In July of that year Hofstede was convicted of
misdemeanor criminal syndicalism in Spokane and sentenced to serve thirty
days in jail.153
In fact, the Washington Bar Association resolved that none of its
members should represent Wobbly defendants.154 In the summer of 1923, the
Washington State Board of Law Examiners notified lawyer Elmer Smith that
it was seeking his disbarment because he represented many Wobblies on the
West Coast. The main basis of this charge was that Smith, knowing the nature
of the IWW and being aware of the criminal syndicalism law, “has advocated
and approved the principles as announced by the Industrial Workers of the
World”; made speeches in support of the organization; aided its recruitment
efforts; and otherwise “used his talents and energies in furtherance of the
cause of the Industrial Workers of the World, and other similar
organizations.”155 Smith was disbarred and lost his appeal to the Washington
State Supreme Court. In its ruling, the court frankly concluded that anyone
who advocated the IWW’s principles was “unworthy of the office of attorney
at law.”156
By 1921, the pace of arrests and prosecutions of Wobblies began to
diminish in Washington. The following year, there was no enforcement of
the felony criminal syndicalism law, although 1923 brought something of a
152. Discharge Jury in Wob Trial, SEATTLE CHRON., Jan. 24, 1920, at 5; Donovan Won’t Defend
I.W.W., SEATTLE CHRON., Jan. 14, 1920, at 6; Prejudice Plea Lets Jurors Off in I.W.W. Trial, SPOKANE
CHRON., Jan. 16, 1920, at 6.
153. Hofstead, I.W.W. Lawyer, Sent Up for Thirty Days, SPOKESMAN-REV. (WA), Jul. 19, 1918, at
6; Halts I.W.W. Lawyer, SPOKESMAN-REV. (WA), July 15, 1918, at 6.
154. Dowell, supra note 3, at 1058.
155. Complaint, In the Matter of the Proceeding for the Disbarment of Elmer S. Smith, State Board
of Law Examiners, State of Washington (1923) (on file with the Walter Reuther Memorial Library,
Industrial Workers of the World Collection, Box 126, File 26); Notice of Hearing, In the Matter of the
Proceedings for the Disbarment of Elmer Smith, State Board of Law Examiners, State of Washington
(1923) (on file with the Walter Reuther Memorial Library, Industrial Workers of the World Collection,
Box 125, File 25); see also Disbarment Proceeding Against Workers Attorney Checked (on file with the
Walter Reuther Memorial Library, Industrial Workers of the World Collection Box 16, File 1).
156. In re Smith, 233 P. 288 (Wash. 1925); see also Brief on Behalf of Defendant Elmer Smith, In
re Smith, 233 P. 288, (Wash. 1925) (on file with the Walter Reuther Memorial Library, Industrial Workers
of the World Collection, Box 126, File 27). Smith would get his license back—in 1930, five years after
he lost it. Elmer Smith Dead, BELLINGHAM HERALD (WA), Mar. 21, 1932, at 1; Elmer Smith Reinstated
After Abandoning His Radical Beliefs, OREGONIAN, Mar. 20, 1930, at 1.
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resurgence in both felony and misdemeanor charges.157 It also took a while
before this reduction in enforcement cleared the state’s prisons of Wobblies.
In January 1921, sixty-four Wobblies were in Washington’s prisons; the last
IWW held on criminal syndicalism charges was not freed until September
1928.158
Enforcement in California unfolded in a similar manner, albeit on a
much larger scale. The state’s powerful open shop interests, which were
concentrated in Los Angeles and the Bay Area but extended across the state,
botched their initial effort to enact a criminal syndicalism law in 1917. Two
years later, they succeeded when their attempts to paint the IWW as a
criminal threat were aided by a string of deadly bombings. Beginning in 1910
with the destruction of the Los Angeles Times Building at the hand of several
left-wing unionists, the incidents also included a deadly attack on a
Preparedness Day Parade in San Francisco in 1916, probably by Anarchists,
and culminated with a nationwide letter-bombing campaign in the spring of
1919 that targeted some thirty-five prominent industrialists and federal and
state officials. 159 Among those targeted in this campaign were not only John
D. Rockefeller, Oliver Wendell Holmes, and Attorney General Palmer, but
also Charles Fickert, the district attorney of San Francisco. Fickert is notable
for conspiring, perhaps to the point of orchestrating, the mysterious bombing
of the California Governor’s Mansion in the fall of 1917 to ensure that federal
officials prosecuted Wobblies for violating the Espionage Act in that state.160
The IWW had nothing to do with any of these affairs, beyond the fact that
the two men who were falsely convicted of the Preparedness Day Bombing,
Tom Mooney and Warren Billings, were former Wobblies.161 But this did not
matter to newspapers, open shop propagandists, and California legislators,
who were very happy to lump all radicals together when it suited their
purposes.
The first arrest under California’s new criminal syndicalism law
occurred in San Francisco in late May 1919, amid a series of raids on union

157.

GUNNS, supra note 134 at 55; I.W.W. Wins in Spokane Trial, INDUS. WORKER, Jan. 20, 1923,

at 1.
158. Iron Heel in Northwest; Status of Cases to Date, INDUS. WORKER, Jan. 15, 1921, at 1; A.S.
Embree Sentenced in Anti-Labor Court, SOLIDARITY, June 4, 1921, at 3; Four I.W.W. Held on Syndicalism
Charge, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Oct. 15, 1921, at 4; Police Stop Amnesty Meeting in Spokane, SOLIDARITY,
Apr. 13, 1921, at 1. On the release of the last IWW prisoner, a man named John Nash, see Dowell, supra
note 3, at 1063.
159. See generally JEFFREY J. JOHNSON, THE 1916 PREPAREDNESS DAY BOMBING: ANARCHY AND
TERRORISM IN PROGRESSIVE ERA AMERICA (Routledge, 2017).
160. ROBERT K. MURRAY, RED SCARE: A STUDY IN NATIONAL HYSTERIA, 1919-1920, at 67-81
(1955); Jeffrey P. Simon, The Forgotten Terrorists Lesson from the History of Terrorism, 20 TERRORISM
& POLITICAL VIOLENCE 195 (2008); Weintraub, supra note 109, at 145-46.
161. See generally RICHARD FROST, THE MOONEY CASE (1968); CURT GENTRY, FRAME-UP: THE
INCREDIBLE CASE OF TOM MOONEY AND WARREN BILLINGS (1967); JEFFREY J. JOHNSON, THE 1916
PREPAREDNESS DAY BOMBING: ANARCHY AND TERRORISM IN PROGRESSIVE ERA AMERICA (2017).
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offices and gatherings in the Bay Area. Arrests rapidly escalated across the
state through the summer and fall of that year.162 The first conviction occurred
in late 1919, when a union official named James McHugo was brought to
trial in Oakland. As was typical in these cases, McHugo’s guilt was premised
on his membership in and work with the IWW. Because he readily admitted
this, the state’s case against McHugo actually turned on the prosecution’s use
of a great deal of IWW literature and the testimony of two special agents of
the U.S. Justice Department, as well as that of former IWW members and
professional witnesses Dymond and Coutts. Their testimony implicated the
IWW in an array of criminal practices, including bombings and sabotage, to
show that the union was a criminal syndicalist organization.163
For several years following the McHugo trial, Dymond and Coutts
would appear as witnesses in many dozens of criminal prosecutions in
California and surrounding states, delivering the same kind of dubious, but
effective, testimony that they provided in that case. They almost never
testified about the actions of anyone then on trial. Nearly always, it was
someone not present who they said had engaged in violence or sabotage to
prove the union’s culpability. In this clever way, these witnesses inculpated
the defendants who were standing trial while avoiding contradiction and
impeachment.164
Despite a vigorous defense by a lawyer named William Cleary who, by
the mid-1920s, would help prosecute radicals, the jury took somewhere
between five and seven minutes to convict McHugo, and the judge sentenced
him to one-to-fourteen years in San Quentin.165 According to Woodrow
Whitten, McHugo’s four-week trial, which was itself patterned after the
Sacramento Espionage Act trial, would in turn serve as “a model” for
subsequent criminal syndicalism prosecutions in California.166 Under this

162. Woodrow C. Whitten, Criminal Syndicalism and the Law in California 1919-1927, 59
TRANSACTIONS OF THE AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 3, 31 (1969); PHOTOSTAT OF DIGEST OF CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL
SYNDICALISM CASES, supra note 149, at 12-15; see also 40 Are Quizzed in L.A. Probe of I.WW., , Oct. 6,
1919, at 1; Latest News, L.A. HERALD, Nov. 11, 1919, at 1.
163. Erwin, supra note 147, at 1; Labor Defense League of California, News Bulletin No. 2 (Nov.
17, 1919) (on file with Princeton University, Mudd Library, ACLU Papers, Correspondence-General:
Legal Defense Requests: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Vol. 90 at 94-95); California Prison and Correctional Records,
San Quentin State Prison, Book No. 10, Inmate No. 33280.
164. CALIFORNIA BRANCH OF THE GEN. DEF. COMM., I.W.W., OUT OF THEIR OWN MOUTHS:
STATEMENTS OF THE THREE MEN WHO SENT ONE HUNDRED MEN TO PRISON UNDER THE CRIMINAL
SYNDICALISM LAW (on file with the Walter Reuther Memorial Library, Industrial Workers of the World
Collection, Box 169-O); GEN. DEF. COMM., I.W.W., CALIFORNIA THE BEAUTIFUL AND THE DAMNED 1629 (on file with the Walter Reuther Memorial Library, Industrial Workers of the World Collection, Box
158-C).
165. Whitten, supra note 162, at 41-42; Legal Persecution Starts in the West, ONE BIG UNION
MONTHLY, July 1919, at 9; Jury Convicts James McHugo of Syndicalism, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 4, 1919, at
1.
166. Whitten, supra note 162, at 42.
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model, which actually differed little from enforcement in other states, police
and prosecutors often charged defendants after raids and planned dragnets.167
Some were singled out for arrest because they were leaders of the
organization, or were found actively organizing.168 Some were arrested
because local capitalists, American Legionnaires, or other influential elites
demanded that they be charged.169 Others were charged when some relatively
insignificant police contact, like a vagrancy arrest, revealed their membership
in the IWW; or when police, having just snatched them up, turned their
pockets out, and found membership cards or union material.170 Some were
arrested while giving speeches.171 Still others were charged during outbreaks
of labor conflict, including large-scale episodes like IWW-led strikes among
construction workers on the massive Hetch Hetchy and Big Creek water
projects in the central part of the state, and on the San Pedro waterfront in the
spring and summer of 1923, when hundreds were arrested and dozens
prosecuted for criminal syndicalism.172
McHugo was not only the first man convicted of criminal syndicalism
in California, he was also the first to be imprisoned. Three weeks after his
conviction and three days before Christmas, 1919, he arrived at San Quentin
to begin serving his term. There he would remain for two years, joined by a
steady stream of other Wobblies who had all been ordered to serve between
two and five years of their one-to-fourteen-year or two-to-twenty-eight-year
sentences. The Wobbly inmates’ numbers steadily grew until, by the fall of
1923, there were over one hundred of them in prison, even though dozens of
defendants convicted at the outset of the campaign had since been released.173
Soon California led all states in felony criminal syndicalism enforcement. By

167.

See, e.g., Eleven Alleged Wobblies Taken in Police Raid, SACRAMENTO UNION, Oct. 25, 1922,

at 2.
168. See, e.g., Test is Planned of I.W.W. Law, SACRAMENTO UNION, Apr. 9, 1922, at 1; Fisherman’s
Union Man Nabbed as Red’, L.A. HERALD, May 2, 1921, at A7; Red Propagandist is Held to Answer to
Superior Court, SACRAMENTO UNION, Aug. 18, 1921, at 8.
169. See, e.g., I.W.W. Convicted by Yolo Jurors, SACRAMENTO UNION, Dec. 17, 1921, at 5; To
Investigate I.W.W. Charges, SACRAMENTO UNION, June 19, 1921, at 15.
170. See, e.g., I.W.W. Delegate Is Arrested Here, SACRAMENTO UNION, Nov. 7, 1922, at 3; 2 Alleged
Members of I.W.W. Are Indicted, SACRAMENTO UNION, Aug. 11, 1922, at 1; Alleged I.W.W. Indicted,
SACRAMENTO UNION, June 9, 1922, at 3; I.W.W. Organizer is Under Indictment, SACRAMENTO UNION,
Nov. 22, 1921, at 3; Police Arrest Two Men as Radicals, L.A. HERALD, Aug. 2, 1921, at 1; Two Alleged
Radicals Held, SACRAMENTO UNION, Jan. 25, 1921, at 5; I.W.W. Propagandists Released on Bail,
SACRAMENTO UNION, Jan. 18, 1920, at 11; To Make Criminal Syndicalism Charge, SACRAMENTO UNION,
Jan. 5, 1920, at 6; Held for Criminal Syndicalism, SACRAMENTO UNION, Nov. 23, 1919, at 11.
171. See, e.g., Man Arraigned on Syndicalist Charge, L.A. HERALD, Sept. 26, 1921, at A7; Man Held
for Trial on 2 I.W.W. Charges, L.A. HERALD, Jan. 20, 1921, at A3.
172. Men Held as Radicals, SACRAMENTO UNION, Oct. 31, 1922, at 11; see also Oil Field Bombing
Suspect Nabbed, L.A. HERALD, Nov. 4, 1919, at 1.
173. Bulletins, California Branch of the General Defense Committee, I.W.W (April 1923-July 1923)
(on file with University of Washington Libraries, Special Collections, Industrial Workers of the World,
Seattle Joint Branches Records, 189-1965, Box 4).
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1924, authorities there had tried 264 defendants on this charge in 94 separate
proceedings and had convicted 164.174
By the end of 1923, the arrest and prosecution of Wobblies on criminal
syndicalism charges had largely ended everywhere, but not before the law
caught up with union men in other states, including Kansas.175 Enacted in
1920 at the behest of powerful wheat and oil interests, Kansas’ law was a
copy of Oregon’s. Among its more tragic victims was Joe Neil, a Wobbly
arrested in Hutchinson, Kansas in May 1922 after trying to solicit 25 cents
from a man on the street. Neil was arrested for vagrancy, but when it emerged
that he was an IWW, the charge was raised to criminal syndicalism.176
Brought to trial on October 7, Neil was convicted that same day of advocating
criminal syndicalism “by word of mouth and by writing.” The jury
recommended that Neil, who was a native of Austria, be deported instead of
imprisoned. But the judge immediately imposed a sentence of one-to-ten
years and sent him off to Lansing. Neil would serve six years, longer than
any other Wobbly convicted of criminal syndicalism or, for that matter, under
the Espionage Act.177
The last IWW prosecuted in Kansas was a man named Harold Fiske,
arrested in the summer of 1923, in Geneseo.178 Fiske was charged with
criminal syndicalism and brought to trial in nearby Lyons that September. In
those proceedings, the organizer took the stand and admitted to his work with
the IWW and the AWIU. Fiske also defended the IWW’s revolutionary
program, while denying that the organization was committed to violence. But
prosecutors countered with membership applications, accounting records,
bylaws, and other documents pertaining to the AWIU, all of which police had
seized from Fiske. Alongside these documents, the prosecution presented
IWW literature and the lyrics to a pro-IWW song, which Fiske composed and

174. PHOTOSTAT OF DIGEST OF CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL SYNDICALISM CASES, supra note 149, at 72;
Whitten, supra note 162, at 65-66 app. C.
175. See, e.g., State of Facts by the Court and County Attorney, State. v. Breen, No. 1820 (Trago
County Ct. 1920) (on file with Kansas Historical Society, Kansas State Penitentiary at Lansing Records,
1861-1952); Opening Brief and Argument of Appellant, State v. Breen, 205 P. 632, No. 23954 (Kan.
1922) (on file with Walter Reuther Memorial Library, Industrial Workers of the World Collection, Box
126, File 12); I.W.W. Pleads Guilty, Fined by Fairchild, HUTCHINSON GAZETTE (KS), Dec. 14, 1921, at
1.
176. Prisoner Interview, Joe Neil, No.7950 (Jan. 18, 1923) (on file with Kansas Historical Society,
Kansas State Penitentiary at Lansing Records, 1861-1952).
177. Records of Joe Neil, No. 7950 (on file with Kansas Historical Society, Kansas State Penitentiary
at Lansing Records, 1861-1952); Minutes of the 14th General Convention of the Industrial Workers of the
World 23 (1922) (on file with the Walter Reuther Memorial Library, Industrial Workers of the World
Collection, Box 3, File 2); Joe Neil Released, Rearrested, INDUS. WORKER, Jun. 30, 1928, at 1; Paulen
Paroles 38, EMPORIA GAZETTE (KS), Jun. 19, 1928, at 6.
178. State v. Fiske, 230 P. 88, 89 (Kan. 1924).
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sang while in jail. This was enough to convict Fiske, who was sentenced by
the judge to one-to-ten-years in prison.179
In Oklahoma, where a criminal syndicalism law was enacted in March
1919 with the strong support of Progressive governor J.B.A. Robertson, and
where antipathy to the IWW was likewise anchored in the oil and wheat
industries, there were also a handful of felony criminal syndicalism
convictions.180 Prominent among these was the conviction of Jack Terrell, an
AWIU job delegate arrested in Enid in June 1919. Despite the testimony of
Terrell, who astounded courtroom spectators with his articulate defense of
himself and the IWW, the jury took only thirty minutes to reach a guilty
verdict. Sentenced to seven years in prison, Terrell was allowed to go free
while his appeal was pending. When his case finally came before the
Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals, Terrell was already in prison in
California, having been convicted of criminal syndicalism there in the
summer of 1923.181
The IWW encountered trouble with the law in other states, too. There
were criminal syndicalism arrests and occasional convictions in Nebraska,182
South Dakota,183 and Minnesota,184 as well as a handful of state sedition
179. Transcript of Record at 3, 9, 19-21, Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927); see also State v.
Fiske, 230 P. 88, 89 (Kan. 1924); Abstract of the Record at 7, Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1925).
180. DOWELL, supra note 73, at 52 n.20; Dowell, supra note 3, at 521-22; SELLARS, supra note 46,
at 134.
181. SELLARS, supra note 46, at 137-39, 170-73; see also Oklahoma “Justice”, SOLIDARITY, Mar.
13, 1920, at 4.
182. On arrests in Nebraska, see, e.g., Cronin Arrested, NEW SOLIDARITY, Oct. 18, 1919, at 3;
Special Telegram, NEW SOLIDARITY, Oct. 11, 1919, at 1. But there was only one conviction. In November
1922, a Wobbly named William Powell who had set about organizing workers in the sugar beet industry
was convicted in Scottsbluff County, his prosecution subsidized by “citizens of the county.” Powell was
run out of town in lieu of imprisonment. Guilty of Syndicalism, LINCOLN JOURNAL STAR, Nov. 24, 1922,
at 5-6; Charge Him as a Wobbly, LINCOLN EVENING J., May 28, 1923, at 8. On this and other Nebraska
cases, see ACLU, Civil Liberty Cases, Vol. V-c, ch. 24 (1923) (on file with Princeton University, Mudd
Library, ACLU Records, The Roger Baldwin Years 1912-1950, Clippings-Cases by State: Michigan,
Missouri, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Vol. 239 at 114-16).
183. Authorities in South Dakota arrested and prosecuted, but did not convict, a handful of Wobblies.
I.W.W. Members Are Escorted from Town by Sheriffs Posse, ABERDEEN J. (SD), Jul. 17, 1921, at 1; An
Advocate of Syndicalism is Lodged in Cell, ABERDEEN (SD) J., Jul. 15, 1921, at 1; In the Courts, NW.
SQUARE DEAL (SD), Aug. 25, 1920, at 8; Municipal Court, ABERDEEN DAILY NEWS (SD), Aug. 18, 1920,
at 18; “Yours for Revolution” is Signature of Casey; Defended by Tom Arnold, ABERDEEN DAILY NEWS
(SD), Jul. 26, 1921, at 1; Lawyer from Chicago for Alleged I.W.W., ABERDEEN J. (SD), Jul. 22, 1922, at
4; I.W.W. Deny Making Any Vicious Talks, DAILY DEADWOOD PIONEER-TIMES (SD), Jul. 29, 1922, at 2;
Two I.W.W. Are Arrested Here for Criminal Syndicalism, ARGUS-LEADER (SD), Jul. 26, 1921, at 1; In
Circuit Court, ARGUS-LEADER (SD), Nov. 16, 1921, at 5; Bosinger’s Jury Is Dismissed, ARGUS-LEADER
(SD), Nov. 7, 1921, at 2.
184. On prosecutions in Minnesota, which produced a handful of convictions, see Judge Reads
Papers, Hangers-On’ Doze in I.W.W. Ouster Suit, STAR TRIB. (MN), Oct. 19, 1917, at 16; Headquarters
of Order Under Fire, STAR TRIB. (MN), Oct. 10, 1917, at 12; Harry Lisk Arrested, DULUTH NEWS-TRIB.,
Oct. 26, 1917, at 5; Hater of America Gets 60-Day Term, DULUTH NEWS-TRIB., Jul. 12, 1917, at 5; Look
Out, Agitators, DULUTH NEWS-TRIB., Jul. 10, 1917, at 5; Lehtonen Acquitted, DULUTH NEWS-TRIB., Aug.
31, 1917, at 5. Gruesome Story Installment No. 4, ONE BIG UNION MONTHLY, June 1920, at 37; State v.
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prosecutions of Wobblies in Montana,185 New Mexico,186 Colorado,187 and
Alaska.188 But most of these occurred either during the war or shortly
afterwards. By 1924, the only state still prosecuting Wobblies for criminal
syndicalism (or sedition) was California. Even in California, only a small
handful of criminal syndicalism cases went to trial that year. Two of the cases
in 1924 resulted in convictions for which ten men received prison sentences.
But at least nine other cases involving over three dozen defendants ended in
acquittals, mistrials, or dismissals.189
IV. THE COURTS AND THE JURISPRUDENCE OF PROGRESSIVE REPRESSION
With few exceptions, trial judges acquiesced in prosecutions of IWW
members. As many of the cases we have seen suggest, only rarely did a judge
dismiss charges over the objections of prosecutors, limit the use of prejudicial
or perjured evidence to convict Wobblies, or show lenience in sentencing.
But passive acquiescence was not the only way that judges endorsed state
repression of the IWW. Judges, at both the trial and appellate levels, worked
actively to make membership in the union a crime and to justify the state’s
exercise of authority to drive the IWW out of existence.
A. Injunctions
Among the most revealing ways that courts participated in the
persecution of Wobblies was their use of injunctions to circumvent some of
the important procedural requirements of criminal punishment and lock up
IWW members without so much as an indictment, let alone a trial. On
January 5, 1920, Judge R.M. Webster of Spokane, Washington issued an
Worker’s Socialist Publishing Company, 185 N.W. 931 (Minn. 1921); Dowell, supra note 3, at 1074;
State v. Worker’s Socialist Publishing Company, 185 N.W. 931 (Minn. 1921); see also REPORT OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL TO THE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA, 1919-1920, at 21 (Minneapolis,
MN: Syndicate Printing Company); REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO THE GOVERNOR OF THE
STATE OF MINNESOTA, 1917-1918, at 26 (Minneapolis, MN: Syndicate Printing Company).
185. A Busy Day in District Court, ANACONDA STANDARD (MT), May 19, 1918, at 15; Ranch Hand
Arrested in Reviling County, GREAT FALLS TRIB. (MT), Jun. 26, 1918, at 3; Cason Faces Charge of
Seditious Utterance, DAILY MISSOULIAN (MT), Apr. 23, 1918, at 3; Fergus Prisoners Get Out of Jail,
GREAT FALLS TRIB. (MT), Nov. 10, 1918, at 4; Seditious Spouter Is Arrested in Lewiston, GREAT FALLS
TRIB. (MT), Aug. 1, 1918, at 2.
186. State v. Diamond, 202 P. 988, 989 (N.M. 1921).
187. Dowell, supra note 3, at 407. Nome Editor Found Guilty of Sedition, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1918,
at I1; Editor Indicted, BELLINGHAM HERALD (WA), Apr. 11, 1918, at 5.
188. FRED THOMPSON, THE I.W.W.: ITS FIRST FIFTY YEARS 38, 48 (1955); Nome Editor Found
Guilty of Sedition, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1918, at I1; Editor Indicted, BELLINGHAM HERALD (WA), Apr.
11, 1918, at 5; John Smith Is Found Guilty, DOUGLAS ISLAND NEWS (AK), May 21, 1920, at 1; DOWELL,
supra note 73, at 310-12, 408, 409; John Smith Is Found Guilty, DOUGLAS ISLAND NEWS (AK), May 21,
1920, at 1.
189. PHOTOSTAT OF DIGEST OF CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL SYNDICALISM CASES, supra note 149, at 5256.
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order which prohibited a particular group of Wobblies “and all others not
now known, whose names and identity may hereafter be disclosed, from
associating, confederating, affiliating, and acting in concert with said named
defendants.”190 Webster’s order also barred these people from remaining
members of the IWW, or remaining in the jurisdiction if they stayed in the
union, and from “advocating, advising, teaching, or promulgating the said
theories, doctrines, practices, and alleged principles” of the IWW.191 Working
with local prosecutors, Judge Webster jailed a number of Wobblies for
contempt of this edict.192
In 1920, a judge in Butler County, Kansas, also moved to preemptively
criminalize the IWW—in the name of “public health”—by granting the
Kansas attorney general’s petition to enjoin the IWW and its affiliates in
wheat and oil from operating in the state.193 Within a month of the
injunction’s issue, twenty-five IWW “agents” had been arrested.194 “The
I.W.W. did not have any success operating in Kansas this year,” enthused
one local paper.195 The attorney general claimed that the order, which
remained in effect the next year, “greatly assisted the state in curbing the
unlawful activities” of the IWW.196
Even more aggressive were the actions of Judge Charles Busick of the
Superior Court of Sacramento County. In August 1923, Busick, who on
another occasion had a group of Wobblies arrested for testifying in behalf of
their fellow workers, enjoined the IWW, its General Executive Board, its
defense bodies, and some thirty individual officials as well as “their servants,
agents, solicitors and attorneys and all others” from engaging in any activities
in the state. In issuing the injunction, Busick drew on an affidavit by Elbert
Coutts that catalogued IWW schemes and outrages, as well as the rationale
that individual Wobblies were all insolvent and immune to conventional civil
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State ex rel. Lindsley v. Wallace, 195 P. 1049, 1049 (Wash. 1921).
Id. at 1050.
192. On the implication for the relator, see State ex rel. Cody v. Superior Court, 192 P. 935, 936
(Wash. 1920). On other instances of enforcement, see, e.g., ex parte Parent, 192 P. 947 (Wash. 1920);
State ex rel. Lindsley v. Wallace, 195 P. 1049 (Wash. 1921); State ex rel. Lindsley v. Grady, 199 P. 980
(Wash. 1921); William Haywood, General Defense, ONE BIG UNION MONTHLY, Sept. 1920, at 58.
193. See State ex rel. Hopkins, 214 P. 617, 617 (Kan. 1923); Appellants’ Brief before Kansas
Supreme Court at 1, State ex rel. Hopkins, 214 P. 617 (on file with the Walter Reuther Memorial Library,
Industrial Workers of the World Collection, Box 126, File 10); see also A Hunt for I.W.W. Agents,
HUTCHINSON (KS) NEWS, Jun. 24, 1920, at 1.
194. I.W.W. Jailed, CHANUTE WEEKLY TRIB., Jul. 16, 1930, at 8; I.W.W. Again in Court, LAWRENCE
DAILY JOURNAL-WORLD (KS), Jul. 22, 1920, at 1; Sentence a Kansas I.W.W., MORNING CHRON. (KS),
Jul. 26, 1920, at 7.
195. Kansas Vigilance Check Mates Efforts of Wobblies in Harvest, HUTCHINSON GAZETTE, Aug. 8,
1920, at 1.
196. TWENTY-FIFTH BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS, 1921-1922, at 18
(Topeka, KS: Kansas State Printing Plant, 1922).
191.
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lawsuits.197 So extreme was Busick’s injunction that the editors of the
mainstream Sacramento Union, which did not make a habit of defending
Wobblies, condemned the measure as a threat to rights of free speech and
trial by jury.198 This did not deter Busick, who made his order permanent.
Only a handful of Wobblies were ultimately arrested for violating his
injunction. But Busick’s decree apparently provoked considerable anxiety
and conflict among union members who were already having trouble enough
with arrests and prosecutions under conventional charges.199
B. State Appeals
A more common kind of complicity among judges was evident in the
frequency with which they upheld the convictions of Wobblies. This was
certainly true of state appellate judges, beginning with a case in Minnesota
that followed soon after Jesse Dunning’s conviction. In late April 1917,
several weeks before Dunning was arrested in Bemidji, four Wobblies were
arrested for criminal syndicalism in Biwabik after they were found posting
IWW “stickerettes” in public places. One of the men, Elias Maki, was
convicted in a separate trial in late September t around the time of Dunning’s
trial. At Maki’s request, the judge in that case put off further proceedings,
including sentencing, and asked the Minnesota Supreme Court to certify
whether the state syndicalism statute was valid. Maki’s lawyer claimed that
the statute violated the U.S. Constitution because it failed to adequately
define the meaning of sabotage, because it constituted cruel and unusual
punishment, and because it constituted an impermissible, discriminatory
form of “class legislation” which violated the Equal Protection Clause. The
state supreme court rejected all of these claims.200 This left the trial court free
to confirm Maki’s conviction and sentence him to six months of jail or a
$1,000 fine; the other defendants, convicted later, got three months or
$500.201
The Minnesota Supreme Court case, State v. Moilen, was the first of a
great number of cases in which appellate courts upheld defendants’
convictions for violating criminal syndicalism laws.202 An example of the
way in which courts justified these decisions—as well as of how defendants
got convicted in the first place—is the case of defendants Robert Dilgar and
197. People v. IWW et al., No. 31125 (Super. Ct., Sacramento County, 1923) (on file with Walter
Reuther Memorial Library, Industrial Workers of the World Collection, Box 125, File 5).
198. Whitten, supra note 162, at 59.
199. Weintraub, supra note 109, at 187; Fifteen Wobs Released, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Oct. 29, 1924,
at 1.
200. State v. Moilen, 167 N.W. 345, 346 (Minn. 1918).
201. Dowell, supra note 3, at 1072-73; Criminal Syndicalism Law Test Asked Here, MINNEAPOLIS
STAR TRIB., Dec. 15, 1917, at 25.
202. There were, to be sure, other rulings, but these tended to involve technical questions about
criminal anarchy statutes. See, e.g., Von Gerichten v. Seitz, 94 A.D. 130 (4th Dept. 1904).
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the well-named Thomas Paine. The two men were charged with criminal
syndicalism in Trego County, Kansas in 1920. In a trial nominally centered
on an attempted escape from the local jail, which in fact was essentially a
criminal syndicalism prosecution, Dilgar and Paine were convicted and
sentenced to two years in prison.
In their appeal to the Kansas Supreme Court, Dilgar and Paine argued
that the escape conviction was unfounded because their confinement had
been illegal in the first place: the bill of information under which they were
arrested “was not sufficiently definite or specific to inform the accused of the
nature and cause of the accusation against them.”203 The issue was not at all
a trivial one; criminal syndicalism statutes were monuments to vagueness and
ambiguity, particularly with regard to the meaning of “sabotage” and
“terrorism.” But this seldom troubled the courts. The court in the case
involving Dilgar and Paine, which upheld their convictions, never decided
the matter.204 For its part, the Moilen court concluded, in the face of a reality
that very much held otherwise, that the meanings of terms like sabotage and
terrorism were “matters of common knowledge.”205
Many other courts agreed that syndicalism statutes were not
unconstitutionally vague. Some resorted to dictionary and encyclopedia
definitions: in 1923, for example, the Idaho Supreme Court invoked a text
which in a circular way conveniently defined sabotage as something the
IWW was known for practicing.206 Still other courts took advantage of the
way that criminal syndicalism laws were written, satisfying themselves that,
even if terms like sabotage or terrorism might be uncertain, the concept of
prohibiting social change by means of unlawful acts—which also qualified
as “criminal syndicalism”—was, of its nature, not unclear, and therefore
upheld these syndicalism laws and the convictions under them.207 In 1921,
the Washington State Supreme Court took a somewhat different approach; it
concluded that the vagueness argument was invalid because there were
“many statutes now on the books which are open to the objection of
uncertainty,” such as vagrancy and malicious mischief, which were widely
accepted and not subject to challenge on vagueness grounds. Never mind that

203. Brief of Appellants at 3, State v. Dilgar, 208 P. 620 (Kan. 1922) (on file with the Walter Reuther
Memorial Library, Industrial Workers of the World Collection, Box 126, File 17).
204. State v. Dilgar, 208 P. at 621.
205. State v. Moilen, 167 N.W. 345, 346 (Minn. 1918).
206. See, e.g., State v. Dingman, 219 P. 760, 762-64 (Idaho 1923); Brief of Appellant at 6, State v.
Dingman, 219 P. 760 (Idaho 1923) (on file with the Walter Reuther Memorial Library, Industrial Workers
of the World Collection, Box 127, File 5).
207. See, e.g., People v. Ruthenberg, 201 N.W. 358, 361 (Mich. 1925); People v. Steelik, 203 P. 78,
83 (Cal. 1921).
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that these statutes were also invoked to repress unionists and working
people.208
On some occasions, defendants’ appeals of their convictions under
syndicalism laws were successful. In January, 1924, the Idaho Supreme
Court ruled in Ex Parte Moore that the state’s criminal syndicalism statute
did not criminalize occasions when workers slowed down on the job or
engaged in other nonviolent forms of “direct action.”209 The ruling, which
was based on a straightforward reading of the statute’s text, seemed like a
blow to the union’s adversaries, given that Idaho police and prosecutors had
often enforced the statute under exactly those circumstances set aside by the
court. But, aside from coming at a time when the IWW was already very
much in decline in Idaho and elsewhere, Ex Parte Moore was quickly
overturned by the legislature. At the urging of Governor Charles Moore,
within days of the decision the legislature amended the statute to criminalize
not only destructive forms of sabotage and the like, but also “slack work” and
“work done in an improper manner.”210
In a few other cases, defendants did manage to get their convictions
overturned because trial courts had erred in explaining the meaning of terms
of like sabotage in their jury instructions.211 But successful claims of this kind
were uncommon. Other courts expressly rejected proposed instructions that
would have required juries to find that the organizations defendants belonged
to were actually committed to prohibited means of industrial or political
change.212
Similarly, state appellate courts consistently approved of allowing juries
to base individual defendants’ culpability on the acts of the IWW, even where
there was no evidence to show that the individual defendants endorsed such
acts.213 In fact, as described in Part III.B, this was the principle upon which
the criminal syndicalism laws were conceived. Appellate judges relied on this
principle of guilt by association to uphold even convictions where a
defendant’s involvement with the IWW predated the enactment of the
criminal syndicalism statute.214 A few courts did seem concerned that, if
defendants were to be convicted based only on membership in the IWW,

208. State v. Hennessy, 195 P. 211, 216 (Wash. 1921); see also Appellants Opening Brief at 3-4,
Hennessy v. Washington, 195 P. 211 (Wash. 1921) (on file with the Walter Reuther Memorial Library,
Industrial Workers of the World Collection, Box 126, File 20).
209. Ex parte Moore, 224 P. 662 (Idaho 1924).
210. Dowell, supra note 3, at 156-65.
211. See, e.g., ex parte Moore, 224 P. at 665; State v. Tonn, 191 N.W. 530, 538 (Iowa 1923); State
v. Aspelin, 203 P. 964, 965 (Wash. 1922).
212. See, e.g., People v. Eaton, 213 P. 275, 276-77 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1923).
213. See, e.g., People v. Powell, 236 P. 311, 314 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1925); People v. Stewart, 230
P. 221, 224 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924); People v. Roe, 209 P. 381, 383-84 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1922).
214. People v. Steelik, 203 P. 78, 84 (Cal. 1921) (the Steelik is alternately spelled as Steelink, though
there is some dispute as to which spelling is correct).
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there should be proof that they knew at least something about the nature of
the organization that they belonged to. But even these courts were usually
satisfied that this knowledge could be inferred from membership.215
Although some state appellate courts took the view that defendants’
possession of radical documents was not enough, by itself, to justify
conviction,216 most courts endorsed the use of IWW literature, songs, and
other propaganda to prove the IWW’s criminality and, therefore, the guilt of
individual defendants, even when there was not much more to the state’s
case.217 On this point, too, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Moilen was typical. The stickerettes that the defendants posted—and which,
aside from membership in the IWW, were the only evidence against them—
did not specifically condone sabotage. But the court determined that, with
their “snarling black cat,” the stickerettes created an “atmosphere…of
intimidation, indicative of a purpose to incite fear in the employers of labor
and to compel submission to labor demands.”218
Not surprisingly, defendants also challenged prosecutors’ use of
unreliable testimony from witnesses like Coutts and Dymond.219 They raised
exceptions based on prosecutorial misconduct.220 They also claimed that their
right to a fair trial was impeded by the intimidation of witnesses with threats
of prosecution.221 But these claims went nowhere.222 Arguments that
imposing such stiff penalties for mere speech and association constituted
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eight Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution were also unsuccessful.223 Indeed, the only grounds on
which defendants prevailed with any regularity were procedural or technical,

215. For example, in the 1924 case People v. Cox, the California District Court of Appeals held that
where one became a member of the IWW, knowledge of its advocacy of illegal acts “is imputed and would
exist in fact just as much as though it were specifically set forth and denominated in the act of the
Legislature condemning such organization.” People v. Cox, 226 P. 14, 16 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924).
216. See, e.g., People v. Thornton, 219 P. 1020 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1923).
217. See, e.g., People v. Taylor, 203 P. 85, 87-89 (Cal. 1921); People v. Lesse, 199 P. 46, 47 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1921). Some courts did take exception to this practice. See, e.g., People v. Erickson, 226 P.
637, 637-38 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924); People v. Leonard, 225 P. 461, 462 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924).
218. State v. Moilen, 167 N.W. 345, 348-49 (Minn. 1918).
219. State v. Tonn, 191 N.W. 530, 537-38 (Iowa 1923); People v. Steelik, 203 at 84-85.
220. People v. Steelik, 203 P. at 83-85.
221. People v. Casdorf, 212 P. 237, 238 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1922).
222. See People v. Steelik, 203 P. at 84-85; State v. Tonn, 191 N.W. at 537-38; People v. Casdorf,
212 P. at 238 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1922). For an example of how such claims were framed, see Appellants’
Opening Brief at 5-12, People v. La Rue, 216 P. 627, No. 684 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1923) (on file with
University of Washington Libraries, Special Collections, Industrial Workers of the World, Seattle Joint
Branches Records, 1890-1965, Box 2).
223. Here, too, other appellate courts found a solid precedent in Moilen, which held that this provision
of the Constitution governed only the type of punishment that could be imposed on defendants, not its
severity. State v. Moilen, 167 N.W. at 347; cf. State v. Hennessy, 151 P. 211, 215 (Wash. 1921).
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including arguments based on jury bias, improper juror selection, or the use
of inadmissible hearsay in grounding convictions.224
By contrast, no state appellate court overturned a criminal syndicalism
conviction on the relatively infrequent occasions when IWW defendants
directly challenged their convictions as substantive violations of their rights
of free speech and association.225 Instead, appellate courts usually dismissed
these arguments out of hand.226 Even when the courts did acknowledge that
some right of speech or association might be at stake, they often decided that
IWW defendants deserved no such protections anyway. This was typified by
the California Supreme Court’s holding that”[t]he right of free speech does
not include the right to advocate the destruction or overthrow the government
or [undertake] the criminal destruction of property.”227 Some defendants
contended that criminal syndicalism laws were an unconstitutional brand of
“class legislation,” meaning that they violated the principle of equal
protection by punishing radicals for seeking to use prohibited means to
change the industrial or political order while not treating vigilantes, police,
and others the same way when they used such means to preserve the social
order.228 This argument made interesting use of a bedrock principle of
Progressive ideology—the idea of formal equality—while simultaneously
appealing to a concept the business community and its allies had used very

224. Dowell, supra note 3, at 1060-61; see, e.g., People v. Sullivan, 211 P. 467, 468-69 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1922); People v. Wismer, 209 P. 259, 261 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1922). In line with this judgment
is a report developed by the head of the California Branch of the IWW’s General Defense Committee. It
documented that as of March 15, 1926, California’s appellate courts had affirmed 141 convictions while
overturning only 55, and that all but two of the reversals were obtained before the state’s intermediate
appellate courts, which typically address more technical or procedural questions. See PHOTOSTAT OF
DIGEST OF CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL SYNDICALISM CASES, supra note 149, at 72.
225. In 1918, the New Mexico Supreme Court did overturn the sedition conviction of Wobbly Jack
Diamond on such grounds. See State v. Diamond, 202 P. 988, 993 (N.M. 1921). A few other state courts
also overturned sedition conviction on grounds of their infringement on free speech and rights of
association, but these cases did not involve Wobblies. See, e.g., State v. Gabriel, 112 A. 611 (N.J. 1919).
226. State v. Berg, 233 P. 497, 501 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1925); see also People v. Steelik, 203 P. at
84 (Cal. 1921); People v. Taylor, 203 P. 85, 88 (Cal. 1921); People v. Cox, 226 P. 14, 15-16 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1924); People v. Wagner, 225 P. 464, 466-67 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924); State v. Hennessy, 195
P. 211, 216 (Wash. 1921).
227. People v. Steelik, 203 P. at 84. That same year, the California Supreme Court also rejected the
appeal of John Taylor. A former Wobbly, Communist Labor Party member, and state secretary of the
Socialist Party, Taylor had been convicted of two counts of criminal syndicalism by an Oakland jury in
May 1920. In People v. Taylor, the court held that the case law on free speech had “no application to a
statute such as ours, which denounces organizations for the purpose of committing crimes against persons
and property in furtherance of political or industrial change.” People v. Taylor, 203 P. 85, 88 (Cal. 1921).
The court also rejected Taylor’s claim that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury as to the
“general right of the masses to strike, and the propriety or impropriety of extending sympathy to the soviet
government of Russia.” Id. at 90-91.
228. State v. Dingman, 219 P. 760, 764 (Idaho 1923); State v. Moilen, 167 N.W. 345, 346-48 (Minn.
1918); State v. Hennessy, 195 P. at 215; State v. Laundy, 204 P. 958, 963 (Or. 1922).
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successfully to invalidate reformist labor legislation.229 But courts were
generally unmoved. They either concluded that because these statutes
criminalized individual acts, they could not constitute a form of class
legislation, or simply decided that the distinction between revolutionaries and
reactionaries was rational and therefore constitutional.230
C. Federal Appeals and First Amendment Doctrine
The state court decisions upholding convictions of IWW members were
decided against a backdrop of what David Rabban describes as “a pervasive
tradition of judicial hostility to free speech.”231 For reasons that had much to
do with the evolving nature of First Amendment law at the time, this hostility
was most evident in the way the federal courts resolved the appeals of
Wobblies and their fellow leftists in this period. In these cases, courts
reconciled their endorsement of antiradical prosecutions with an emerging
jurisprudence that appeared to be progressive, liberal, and against state
repression. In fact, a review of federal cases involving the prosecution of
Wobblies and other leftists reveals a striking consensus among judges that
the Espionage Act and the criminal syndicalism laws were entirely valid
forms of suppression, even as federal courts purported to expand the
Constitution’s protections of free speech.
Central to this story is the role of the “clear and present danger test,” a
doctrine developed by Oliver Wendell Holmes and embraced by the Supreme
Court in its 1919 decision Schenck v. United States.232 Schenck was one of a
trio of cases the Court decided that term which upheld convictions under the
Espionage Act of two years prior.233 The clear and present danger test implied
that speech and association could only be limited when they “threatened to
create a clear and present danger” that “substantive evils” which the
government “has a right to prevent” might come about.234 Despite framing
this test as a protection against repression, the Court demonstrated the ease
by which the test could be manipulated when it concluded that clear and
present dangers were indeed present in the cases before it, even though these
229. On this tradition in American jurisprudence, see Claudio J. Katz, Protective Labor Legislation
in the Courts Substantive Due Process and Fairness in the Courts, 31 L. & HIST. REV. 275 (2013).
230. See, e.g., People v. Wieler, 204 P. 410, 411 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921); State v. Dingman, 219
P. at 764; State v. Hennessy, 195 P. at 215. In Moilen, the court drew on the logic of Progressivism to
subvert the defendants’ claim, by asserting—rather counterfactually—that because class legislation in
favor of workers had “been sustained by courts with few exceptions,” the authority of states to regulate
“the relation of master and servant” was “thoroughly settled,” and that there was therefore no basis for
claiming that the criminal syndicalism statutes were discriminatory and unconstitutional. State v. Moilen,
140 Minn. at 116.
231. David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
1205, 1208 (Fall 1983).
232. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
233. Rabban, supra note 231, at 1211.
234. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. at 48.
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cases involved nothing more than peaceful, verbal agitation against war and
the draft.
The conclusion that the state has a right to shut down radical dialogue is
consistent with Justice Holmes’ overall jurisprudence and social vision. Like
more than a few other Progressives, Justice Holmes was a Social Darwinist,
a devotee of Thomas Malthus, and a champion of the need for a firm program
of social control.235 Justice Holmes made no secret of his deep antipathy to
radicalism and had earlier made clear his view that the prerogative to speak
freely was very much a privilege and not a broad right.236 He also believed,
like most Progressives, in expanding the use of the law to achieve his
purposes. Consequently, Justice Holmes had no trouble embracing the idea
of punishing people who promoted deviant ideas and using the law to wage
what he conceived of as a war for social supremacy.237
From this vantage point, it is easier to appreciate Rabban’s judgment
that the clear and present danger test allowed Justice Holmes to codify a
“deference to community will” that “derived from his Social Darwinism.”238
In Richard Sklar’s words, the test Holmes authored “did not stem from any
tenderness toward free speech” but rather from an effort by the Justice and
his colleagues on the Court to validate Congress’s power to punish speech.
Given the way the Constitution limited Congress’s authority to do so,
validating this power meant requiring that legislation aimed at limiting
speech address “proximate” evils.239 As Sklar explains, by making the reach
of the Constitution’s protections contingent on the subjective intent of the
defendant, the test allowed jurors and judges to infer that intent from the
defendant’s political positions. 240
In Abrams v. United States, decided later in 1919, the Supreme Court
upheld the Espionage Act convictions of five radicals, all Jewish immigrants
from Russia, who had been prosecuted for publishing leaflets that criticized
America’s military intervention against the Russian Revolution.241 Justice
John Clarke, who wrote the majority opinion, did not invoke Holmes’ clear
and present danger test.242 Instead, he seemed to resurrect an earlierformulated doctrine, the amorphous “bad tendency” test.243 But this was of
little consequence; the bad tendency test, though on its face somewhat more
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Rabban, supra note 231 at 1210, 1268-71, 1319.
Rabban, supra note 231, at 1210; Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
237. Rabban, supra note 231, at 1268-70.
238. Id. at 1278.
239. Richard L. Sklar, The Fiction of the First Freedom, 6 W. POL. Q. 302, 305 (June 1953).
240. Id. at 305-06; see also Rabban, supra note 231, at 1212, 1265-83.
241. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 617 (1919).
242. Id. at 616-24.
243. On the scope and meaning of the bad tendency test, see generally Edward J. Bloustein, The First
Amendment “Bad Tendency” of Speech Doctrine, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 507 (1990-1991).
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generous to the government, was not that different from the clear and present
danger test in practice.244
Clarke’s opinion in Abrams actually cited Schenck and the other two
Espionage Act cases decided a week after it: Frohwerk v. United States and
Debs v. United States. In Debs, Justice Holmes disposed of the appeal of
Eugene Debs’ 1918 conviction for a speech the Socialist leader had given in
Canton, Ohio, that year. Justice Holmes characterized Debs’ failure to
condemn the war that day as somehow constituting proof of his intent to
violate the law.245 Like Schenck, Debs and Frohwerk were both unanimous
decisions authored by Justice Holmes that met with no objections from
Justice Brandeis or his relatively progressive colleagues on the Court: Joseph
McKenna, William Day, and Edward White. Together with Schenck, these
cases bolstered the Abrams Court’s conclusion that the defendants presented
enough of a danger to warrant conviction.246
Abrams was the first of series of cases in which Justices Holmes and
Brandeis dissented from majority rulings that upheld restrictions on speech.
Justice Holmes’s dissent has been described as a “landmark” and “turning
point” for these justices, marking their evolution into earnest supporters of
civil liberties who eventually set the Supreme Court on a more libertarian
path.247 In reality, Justice Holmes’s willingness to set aside the conviction fit
very well with his Social Darwinist tendencies, as he cast the defendants as
“poor and puny anonymities” who had published a “silly leaflet” and
suggested that, if their speech was worth protecting, it was because it was not
worth much at all.248
The Supreme Court declined to review any of the IWW’s appeals of its
members’ Espionage Act convictions.249 But its decisions in Abrams,
Frohwerk, and Debs, and had already made clear how the circuit courts
would treat such appeals. In October 1920, the Seventh Circuit overturned
counts one and two of the Chicago convictions: count one because it
duplicated count three, and count two because the charge, “conspiring to
interfere with rights or privileges secured by federal law to various businesses
by preventing them from producing and selling goods to the government,”
rested on the improper assumption that these rights were guaranteed by
federal law. The decision affected the amount of fines that some defendants
were liable for, but otherwise had no practical consequence. The other two
244.

Rabban, supra note 231, 1258-65.
Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 212-13 (1919).
246. Rabban, supra note 231, at 1257-65.
247. Id. at 1303, 1305-06; see also THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT: HOW OLIVER WENDELL
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Metropolitan, 2013).
248. Abrams v. United States, 215 U.S. 616, 628-29 (1919).
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counts, one of which invoked the Espionage Act, withstood a great number
of challenges regarding the sufficiency of the evidence and the way the
charges were framed in the indictments and jury instructions.250
The appeals in other Espionage Act cases fared no better. The Ninth
Circuit cited Frohwerk, among other opinions, in a decision that upheld all
counts in the Sacramento Case.251 The Eighth Circuit did overturn the Kansas
City defendants’ convictions on count one, which charged them with
seditious conspiracy, because the court determined that the charge had not
been properly defined for the jury.252 But it cited Schenck and Frohwerk to
uphold the convictions on counts two and three, which charged conspiracy to
impede the draft and create dissention in the armed forces, as well as count
four, which charged the defendants with conspiring to violate the Lever
Act.253
The Supreme Court did not decide the constitutionality of any cases
arising from state criminal syndicalism prosecutions until 1927, when it
disposed of three in a single day. First was the appeal of Harold Fiske, whose
conviction the Court overturned due to inadequate evidence and lack of due
process.254 A second involved the appeal of Wobbly William Burns,
convicted in 1923 of violating various California laws, including California’s
criminal syndicalism statute.255 In this case, the Court considered whether the
trial judge’s instruction to the jury properly defined the meaning of sabotage.
For Justice Pierce Butler, the instruction might have been overly broad, but
this was irrelevant in the face of the evidence showing that Burns was a
member of and organizer for the IWW, which was in every way committed
to the practice of sabotage, however it might be defined.256 Responding to the
contention of Burns’ lawyers that California’s statute was “void for
uncertainty,” Butler merely pointed to the Court’s “adverse” decision in
250. Haywood v. United States, 268 F. 795, 799, 805-08 (7th Cir. 1920). The defendants’ sentences
remained unchanged and those who had since been released on bail pending appeal were returned to
prison. See DUBOFSKY note 9 at 459.
251. Anderson v. United States, 269 F. 65 (9th Cir. 1921); Koppes, supra note 112 at 356.
252. Anderson v. United States 273 F. 20, 21-27 (8th Cir. 1921).
253. See id. at 28-30; Koppes, supra note 112 at 357-58. Because of how the defendants’ sentences
had been determined, this ruling resulted in the release of nineteen of the defendants, who had served all
the time they received under the remaining counts. However, the others remained in prison.
254. In this regard, the Court was particularly troubled by the fact that the only real proof of Fiske’s
belief in criminal syndicalism consisted of the presentation to the jury of the preamble of the IWW’s
constitution—a document that was used to convict many other Wobblies. See Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S.
380, 383-87 (1927).
255. Burns was put on trial in December 1923 on criminal syndicalism charges, after he rejected an
offer from the federal prosecutor to walk free if he renounced the IWW. See Burns v. United States, 274
U.S. 328 (1927); Bulletins, California Branch of the General Defense Committee, I.W.W. (May 6, 1923,
July 11, 1923, Nov. 24, 1923, Oct. 18, 1924) (on file with University of Washington Libraries, Special
Collections, Industrial Workers of the World, Seattle Joint Branches Collection, Box 4); PHOTOSTAT OF
DIGEST OF CRIMINAL SYNDICALISM CASES, supra note 149, 51-54.
256. Burns v. United States, 274 U.S. at 331-37.
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Whitney v. California, the third criminal syndicalism cased decided that
day.257
Whitney involved the 1920 prosecution and conviction of Charlotte
Anita Whitney. A child of great privilege, Whitney had lived much of her life
as a Progressive, before moving further to the left and passing “over the line,
the invisible line,” as she put it, “which divides mankind into two different
groups.”258 During the early 1910s, Whitney supported Wobblies implicated
in the Wheatland Affair and was later active in aiding the legal defense of
Mooney and Billings, the two former Wobblies who had been wrongly
convicted of the Preparedness Day Bombing.259 A member of the Socialist
Party since 1914, Whitney was one of many left-wing party members who
supported the reformation of the state Socialist Party into a state chapter of
the Communist Labor Party, or CLP, in November 1919.260
Whitney was arrested and charged with criminal syndicalism in
Oakland, on the evening of November 28, 1919, just after she delivered a
speech before 150 members of the California Civic League on “The Negro
Problem in the United States.”261 Whitney was convicted on February 20,
1920, after prosecutors had argued that Whitney’s membership in the CLP
made her guilty of criminal syndicalism, because the CLP was but a “political
adjunct of the I.W.W.”262 Several days after her conviction, Whitney was
sentenced to one-to-fourteen years in prison, jailed for eleven days, and then
freed pending appeal. 263
Seven years later, the Supreme Court upheld her conviction. Writing for
the Court’s majority, Justice Edward Stanford, who was no Progressive,
dismissed every one of the arguments advanced by Whitney’s lawyers.264

257.

Id. at 331-32.
Lisa Rubens, The Patrician Radical Charlotte Anita Whitney, 65 CAL. HIST. 3, 158, 160-61
(Sept. 1986); Beth Slutsky, Parlor Pink Turned Soapbox Red The Trial of Charlotte Anita Whitney, 9
AM. COMMUNIST HIST. 35, 38-41 (2010).
259. Slutsky, supra note 258, at 41-42.
260. Ralph E. Shaffer, Formation of the California Communist Labor Party, 36 PAC. HIST. REV. 59,
73-78 (Feb. 1967).
261. GLENDA E. GILMORE, DEFYING DIXIE: THE RADICAL ROOTS OF CIVIL RIGHTS, 1919-1950
(2009).
262. This assertion was neither entirely true nor completely false. The CLP was not an appendage of
the IWW, but it was closely connected to the union. Composed of many westerners like Whitney, the
dissident left-wing delegates to the Socialist Party’s national convention in Chicago who founded the CLP
in early September 1919 had some IWWs in their ranks. They also devised a program that focused on
labor organizing, industrial unionism, and “direct action.” Shaffer, supra note 260, at 59, 71. The
prosecution also relied on the testimony of Coutts and Dymond, who drew a very tenuous link between
Whitney and the dubious story of a bombmaking laboratory on a houseboat in Stockton that was used to
convict a number of Wobblies. Whitten, supra note 162, at 46; see also Slutsky, supra note 258, at 46-48;
Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v.
California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653, 658-59 (1988).
263. Whitten, supra note 162, at 47; Slutsky, supra note 258, at 49.
264. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 367-70 (1927).
258.
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Citing his own majority opinion in Gitlow v. New York, which upheld the
conviction of another Socialist-turned-Communist under New York’s
criminal anarchy law while also affirming the “incorporation” of the First
Amendment against the states, Justice Stanford averred that California was
within its rights to “punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances
inimical to the public welfare, tending to incite to crime, disturb the public
peace or endanger the foundations of organized government and threaten its
overthrow by unlawful means.”265
More famous than Sanford’s opinion in Whitney, though, is the
concurrence written by Justice Brandeis and joined by Justice Holmes.
Justice Brandeis believed very much in the quintessentially Progressive need
to manage modern, capitalist society.266 But he also retained a great faith in
capitalism’s value as a fount of freedom, economic advancement, and
individual self-fulfillment.267 Moreover, Justice Brandeis had little truck with
radicalism, least of all the kind promoted by the IWW, even though he had
mentored a young Roger Baldwin, the one-time Wobbly and Harvard man
who founded the American Civil Liberties Union.268 As David Rabban
contends, although Justice Brandeis was often sympathetic to conventional
unionism, he loathed and feared the IWW, which he saw as a source of
disorder and a threat to capitalism, and supported the government’s
prerogative to rein it in.269
Justice Brandeis’s opinion in Whitney is often lauded as an elegant paean
to the virtues of free speech and association.270 The concurrence is notable
for its insistence that free speech and association are “fundamental rights”;
its conclusion that those who “won our independence by revolution were not
cowards,” but rather people who sought to preserve “liberty”; and its
argument that “it must remain open to a defendant to present the issue
whether there did exist at the time a clear danger, whether the danger, if any,
was imminent, and whether the evil apprehended was one so substantial as
to justify the stringent restriction imposed by the Legislature.”271 Justice
Brandeis condemned Whitney’s lawyers for failing to put the clear and
present danger test, or evidence to support her claims under it, before the jury
265.

Id. at 371.
Id. at 370-80; Rabban, supra note 231, at 1321-23.
267. Rabban, supra note 231, at 1323-25.
268. Id. at 1325-26, 1328 n.763.
269. Id. at 1323-25.
270. See, e.g., Aviam Soifer, Reviewing Legal Fictions, 20 GA. L. REV. 871, 904 (1986) (“the most
powerful judicial discussion of first amendment freedoms ever written”); MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D.
BRANDEIS: A LIFE, 489 (2012) (“in some cases his writing rose to the level of elegance; there are few
cases in American constitutional law that can match the powerful rhetoric of his opinion in the Whitney
case”); JEFFREY ROSEN, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: AMERICAN PROPHET 123 (2016) (“Brandeis’s opinion
represents the most important defense of freedom of thought and opinion since Jefferson’s First
Inaugural”)
271. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. at 373-74, 379.
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and the trial court, but also concluded that “there was evidence on which the
court or jury might have found that such a danger existed.”272 Indeed, Justice
Brandeis asserted that “there was other testimony which tended to establish
the existence of a conspiracy on the part of members of the Industrial
Workers of the World to commit present serious crimes, and likewise to show
that such a conspiracy would be furthered by the activity of the society [the
CLP] of which Miss Whitney was a member.”273 “Under these
circumstances,” Brandeis concludes, “the judgment of the State court cannot
be disturbed.”274
What Justice Brandeis actually articulated with his opinion in Whitney
was a jurisprudence—not unlike that evinced by Justice Holmes in his
Abrams dissent—that defended radicals and other dissidents only when they
were weak and unlikely to be of any consequence. A superficial reading of
this opinion might lead one to support lauding Justice Brandeis as a defender
of the “oppressed”275 or, along with Holmes, as a “champion of free
expression.”276 However, the concurrence did little more than Holmes’
dissent in Abrams to suggest limitations on the discretion of judges to
determine when speech or conduct is dangerous.277 Ultimately, the clear and
present danger test subjects the rights of freedom of speech and association
to the power of police and prosecutors to foment fears and anxieties, to
cultivate threats, and to impugn radicals as dangerous people. This underlay
not only Whitney’s conviction, but those of hundreds of Wobblies.278
V. LAW, PUNISHMENT, AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE IWW
Nationwide, from the middle of 1917 through the end of 1924, it is likely
that between 1,500 and 2,000 people were arrested and charged, at least
informally, with criminal syndicalism. The majority of these were released
or had charges dismissed at trial, but a very significant number of defendants
went to prison—131 in California, 30 in Idaho, about 100 in Washington and

272.

Id. at 379.
Id. at 373-74, 379.
274. Id. at 357, 379.
275. On this characterization of Brandeis, see Rabban, supra note 231, at 1321.
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Oregon, and smaller numbers in other states, for a total of 300.279 How many
served jail time on misdemeanor charges is impossible to determine with any
accuracy, but a rough estimate of several hundred seems reasonable. And, of
course, in addition to these were the nearly two-hundred IWW members who
were sentenced to prison in the Espionage Act cases.280 This torrent of
punishment played a crucial role in the destruction the IWW, not only by
what it did to these individuals but also by what it cost the union and its
supporters trying to get them out.
A. The Long Journey to Freedom
With opportunities for successful appeal so limited, the only chance that
most IWW inmates had to leave prison early was through some kind of
discretionary release. At the federal level, this involved an “amnesty”
campaign which, by the early 1920s, highlighted the support the union
received from left-leaning Progressives who had rejected the prosecutions
from the outset or had more recently come to think that the prosecutions had
either gone too far or, with the war over, served their purpose.281
The amnesty campaign sought the release of all Espionage Act
prisoners, not just the Wobblies. Altogether, some 1,055 people were
convicted during and just after the war of violating sections 3 or 4 of the
Espionage Act.282 Besides IWWs, their ranks included hundreds of Socialists
and religious objectors to the war, as well a fair number of Anarchists, black
nationalists, and other victims of this period’s consuming authoritarianism
and militarism.283 Some fifty members of Congress joined to demand their
279. On the number of imprisonments in California, see PHOTOSTAT OF DIGEST OF CALIFORNIA
CRIMINAL SYNDICALISM CASES, supra note 149, at 72; Whitten, supra note 162, at 65-66 app. C. On the
number in Idaho, see INMATES OF THE IDAHO STATE PENITENTIARY, 1864-1947: A COMPREHENSIVE
CATALOG vii (Rachel S. Johnstone, ed. 2008). The figure for Oregon and Washington is a rough estimate
based on various sources, including ALBERT F. GUNNS, CIVIL LIBERTIES IN CRISIS: THE PACIFIC
NORTHWEST, 1917-1920, at 42 (1983); Dowell, supra note 3, at 1063; Iron Heel in Northwest; Status of
Cases to Date, INDUS. WORKER, Jan. 15, 1921, at 1; A.S. Embree Sentenced in Anti-Labor Court,
SOLIDARITY, June 4, 1921, at 3; Four I.W.W. Held on Syndicalism Charge, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Oct. 15,
1921, at 4; Police Stop Amnesty Meeting in Spokane, SOLIDARITY, Apr. 13, 1921, at 1.
280. HARRY N. SCHREIBER, THE WILSON ADMINISTRATION AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 58 (1960);
Amnesty and Pardon for Political Prisoners Hearings on S.J. Res. 171 Before Subcomm. of the Comm.
On the Judiciary, 66th Cong. 69-75 (1921) (testimony of A. Mitchell Palmer); Amnesty and Pardon for
Political Prisoners Hearings on H.J. Res. 60 Before Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 1-2 (testimony
of Albert De Sliver).
281. In the former category was U.S. Senator William Borah, who, in 1906, in one of the great trials
in American history, had unsuccessfully prosecuted Big Bill Haywood for complicity in the murder of the
former governor of Idaho. J. ANTHONY LUKAS, BIG TROUBLE: A MURDER IN A SMALL WESTERN TOWN
SETS OFF A STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF AMERICA (Simon & Schuster 1998). A critic of the Espionage
Act who voted against the law on final passage, Borah worked hard on behalf of the people convicted
under this law. CHAPLIN, supra note 58, at 332.
282. SCHREIBER, supra note 280, at 78.
283. STEPHEN M. KOHN, AMERICAN POLITICAL PRISONERS: PROSECUTIONS UNDER THE ESPIONAGE
AND SEDITION ACTS (1994).
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release, along with a fair number left-leaning Progressive activists.284 So did
some unions, including the United Mine Workers, the International
Association of Machinists, and dozens of local labor federations.285 The
defendants also had the support of liberal churches, especially those
associated the Federal Council of Churches, as well as some of the big
newspapers, which had taken to questioning Congress’s failure to repeal the
Espionage Act after the war.286 Most helpful of all was the American Civil
Liberties Union, an organization founded in 1920, primarily by Roger
Baldwin, two years after Baldwin initiated his own brief membership in the
IWW following his six-month imprisonment for violating the Selective Draft
Act.287 Baldwin constructed the ACLU from the National Civil Liberties
Bureau, founded by him and radical feminist Chrystal Eastman in 1917.288
Nevertheless, the drive to secure the prisoners’ release met plenty of
resistance from American Legionnaires, right-wing clergy, government
officials, and much of the mainstream press, who—as the Red Scare overtook
the war in justifying their hostility to the people—insisted that the defendants
remain behind bars.289 And then, too, there were the Wobblies themselves. A
majority of IWW prisoners initially rejected the government’s demand that
they apply individually for clemency290 Many also refused to agree to the
conditions sought to be imposed on their release, including the requirement,
proposed as a condition of parole, that they admit their guilt or renounce the
union. Some who did accept clemency were troubled by what this entailed.
For instance, a group of eight Wobblies who left prison in mid-1922 were
sufficiently distressed by the experience to declare that “there is something
about our freedom that hurts.”291 Others, though, were more eager to accept
early release, and found themselves on the other side of a conflict that split
the inmates into two increasingly hostile camps.
In mid-1922, by which time most Espionage Act defendants who were
not IWWs had been released, 95 Wobblies remained in prison for violating
the Espionage Act. By the first part of the following year, there were still
284. William Seraile, Ben Fletcher, I.W.W. Organizer, 46 PA. HISTORY: A JOURNAL OF MIDATLANTIC STUD. 212, 224 (1979).
285. ACLU ANNUAL REPORT NO. 2, 9-16 (1923).
286. See, e.g., Mercy for 50 Prisoners, WASH. POST, May 9, 1919, at 6; The Superfluous Espionage
Act, BOSTON DAILY GLOBE, Feb. 10, 1919, at 6.
287. WEINRIB, supra note 30 at 80-102 (2001).
288. WEINRIB, supra note 30, at 52-57, 67-70, 108-10.
289. ACLU, Civil Liberties Issues In General (1923) (on file with Princeton University, Mudd
Library, ACLU Papers, The Roger Baldwin Years, 1912-1950, Clippings-General: Propaganda for Civil
Liberties, Amnesty Campaign, Release of State Political Prisoners, Vol. 233).
290. CHESTER, supra note 9, at 217.
291. ACLU, General Material, Vol. II-E, Amnesty Political Prisoners, Section XIII-A 180 (1922) (on
file with Princeton University, Mudd Library, ACLU Papers, The Roger Baldwin Years, 1912-1950,
Clippings-General: Amnesty: Political Prisoners, Vol. 199, at 60, article entitled, “Eight Men Just Out of
Prison Write to You”).
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some 50 in custody. In the summer of 1923, when President Warren
Harding’s administration floated another offer of clemency, this one saddled
with fewer conditions, all but eleven of the remaining IWW inmates accepted
it.292 Ten days before Christmas that year, President Calvin Coolidge
removed the remaining conditions, and these hold-outs finally gained their
freedom.293
Many criminal syndicalism defendants had done their best to get sent to
prison in the first place, disdaining trial judges’ offers of probation or
leniency if they renounced the IWW, sometimes celebrating their
convictions, and in some cases even demanding to be incarcerated.294 It is
therefore not surprising that many were not eager to leave prison, particularly
if this implied a compromise of their principles. For several years, five
Wobblies serving prison sentences for criminal syndicalism in Washington
observed the same principle as many Espionage Act defendants and refused
the governor’s offer of parole. The men would only accept a pardon, and only
on the condition that other Wobblies serving time were also released.295 On
November 7, 1923, forty-one Wobbly inmates at San Quentin State Prison in
California endorsed a resolution “reaffirming” their opposition to parole.296
In fact, in a way that courageously confirmed both the truth of their own
judgment about the nature of the state and its legal system and the deep, moral
foundations of their voluntarist beliefs, many other defendants declined trial
judges’ offers to impose probation in lieu of prison, or to help with parole, if
they renounced their radicalism.297
B. The Realities of Confinement
At least two Wobbly defendants committed suicide while in custody on
criminal syndicalism charges.298 Scores of Wobblies were held in solitary
292. CHESTER, supra note 9, at 216-21; Amnesty and Pardon for Political Prisoners Hearings on
H.J. Res. 60 Before Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 1-4 (testimony of Albert De Sliver).
293. Taft, supra note 93, at 80-91.
294. See, e.g., Radicals Are Sent to Prison, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1923, at II1; 9 I.W.W.’s Yell and
Cheer at Sentence, L.A. HERALD, Dec. 9, 1921, at 3; Oakland I.W.W. Spurns Judge’s Offer to Pardon,
INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Dec. 31, 1921, at 5.
295. Criminal Syndicalism Prisoners Refuse to Leave Centralia Boys, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Apr. 29,
1925, at 3.
296. San Quentin Bunch on Record against Parole, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Aug. 1923 (on file with
Princeton University, Mudd Library, ACLU Papers, The Roger Baldwin Years, 1912-1950, ClippingsGeneral: Propaganda for Civil Liberties, Amnesty Campaign, Release of State Political Prisons, Vol. 233,
at 384).
297. See, e.g., He Prefers Jail to Renouncing His Beliefs, PRODUCERS NEWS (MT), Oct. 20, 1922, at
1; see also Oakland I.W.W. Spurns Judge’s Offer to Pardon, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Dec. 31, 1921, at 5;
Pardon, Never Offered, Refused, OAKLAND TRIB., Dec. 23, 1921, at 2; Twenty-Seven Los Angeles IWWs
Convicted; Transport Workers Call Protest, INDUS. WORKER, Jul. 18, 1923, at 1.
298. ACLU, American Civil Liberties Cases, States, Correspondence, California 43-47 (1925) (on
file with Princeton University, Mudd Library, ACLU Papers, The Roger Baldwin Years, 1912-1950,
Correspondence-Cases By State: California, Vol. 284C, at 32-34); California Prison and Correctional
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confinement, locked up in prison units with names like the “dungeon,” the
“dark hole,” or the “slaughter house,” or given debilitating jobs in prison
mills. Hundreds languished in squalid jails for weeks or months, awaiting
trial but unable to raise bail.299 A large number were beaten and sometimes
seriously injured by police, jailors, and fellow inmates. About a dozen
defendants died while in custody while others had their lives shortened by
what they endured.
Such treatment often led, eventually, to more brutality. Consider the case
of eight Wobblies who, in the summer of 1923, went on strike at California’s
San Quentin, refused to work, and were also “thrown into the dungeon and
placed on a bread-and-water diet.”300 They struck to support another Wobbly
inmate who had been sent to the dungeon after he refused to work.301 In
October 1923, 58 out of 74 Wobblies confined at San Quentin were briefly
thrown into solitary confinement after striking to protest the beating of one
of their men by a guard and his subsequent confinement in the “dungeon.”302
The next month, 71 Wobblies struck to protest another beating of a fellow
worker and were placed in the dungeon and in solitary.303
What defendants endured in federal confinement was no better. Inmates
were regularly punished for petty violations, which included insolence,
speaking without permission, leaving food on their plates, loafing or doing
slack work, reading or smoking without permission, or saying too much
about life in prison in their letters. Often these violations resulted in
“restricted diet,” downgrading of their work assignments, loss of privileges,

Records, San Quentin, Book No. 10, Inmate No. 33739; In Jail, Cuts His Throat, EAST OREGONIAN (OR),
Mar. 5, 1920, at 11; Tragical Ending of a Syndicalist Case, INDUS. WORKER, Jun. 5, 1920, at 1.
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Mudd Library, ACLU Papers, The Roger Baldwin Years, 1912-1950, Correspondence-Cases by State:
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UNION, Aug. 2, 1922, at 1.
301. Wobblies in Solitary, L.A. TIMES, Jun. 23, 1923, at 1.
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University, Mudd Library, ACLU Papers, The Roger Baldwin Years, 1912-1950, Clippings-Cases by
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Strike, Is Rumor, PENN-CENTRAL NEWS, Oct. 27, 1923 (on file with Princeton University, Mudd Library,
ACLU Papers, The Roger Baldwin Years, 1012-1950, Clippings-General: Propaganda for Civil Liberties,
Amnesty Campaign, Release of State Political Prisoners, Vol. 236, at 353); Bulletin, California Branch of
the General Defense Committee, I.W.W. (Oct. 6, 1923) (on file with University of Washington Libraries,
Special Collections, Industrial Workers of the World Seattle Joint Branches Collection, Box 4).
303. Bulletin, California Branch of the General Defense Committee, I.W.W. (Nov. 24, 1923) (on file
with University of Washington Libraries, Special Collections, Industrial Workers of the World Seattle
Joint Branches Collection). By the end of 1924, there had been nine strikes like this at San Quentin, and
each one had resulted in severe punishment. Bulletin, California Branch of the General Defense
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or “isolation.”304 During their first months at Leavenworth, a group of some
thirty Wobblies who were charged with fomenting a “general strike” during
a coal-moving job ended up chained seven hours a day for weeks on end to
the doors of the isolation cells, their arms pulled up over their heads. In April
1919, a number of Wobblies at Leavenworth were charged with instigating a
riot in the cafeteria and thrown into the “dark hole,” where they were beaten
senseless by club-wielding trustees.305
C. The Costs of Repression
When Wobbly Nicholas Steelink left San Quentin, he found he “was still
under surveillance by the government.” He was a “veteran soldier,” he said,
and remained committed to the cause and optimistic about the IWW’s
prospects: “I thought that if we had a hundred individuals like myself, we
could make an impact.” But he came to see how wrong he was about this.
“We still had IWW members conducting strikes, but the movement made
from 1910 to 1920 had been destroyed. We didn’t have enough workers to
carry on.”306 After his time in prison, Steelink reflected that he “could not be
the same IWW that I was before.”307
The Los Angeles Times had touted Steelink’s sentencing as an event that
“throws scare into [the] Wobblies” and had likely caused a number of IWW
members “to fold their tents like the Arabs [sic] and silently steal away to
umbrageous parts far removed from the strife of the law abiding in arms
against the lawless.”308 Certainly it had. Those members who did abandon the
IWW returned to the union, like Steelink, not only beaten down but forced to
reckon with the toll that repression had taken on the organization itself.
Reflecting on the progress the union had made in the late 1910s, and what it
had continued to face as repression accelerated, Wobbly Jack Miller recalled
that “[w]hat hurt us the most was the defense trial they kept putting us
through. We had to continuously raise money for the trials instead of
304. See also Record of James Quinlan, No. 13579, United States Penitentiary, Leavenworth, KS (on
file with National Archives, Washington D.C., Records of the Office of the Pardon Attorney, Record
Group 204, Pardon Attorney Sacramento Case Files-James Quinlan, 002366-013-0690); Record of G.J.
Bourg, No. 13118, United States Penitentiary, Leavenworth, KS (on file with National Archives,
Washington D.C , Records of the Office of the Pardon Attorney, Record Group 204, Pardon Attorney
Chicago Case Files-G.J. Bourg, 002366-012-0303); Record of Alexander Cournos, No. 13123, United
States Penitentiary, Leavenworth, KA (on file with National Archives, Washington D.C., Records of the
Office of the Pardon Attorney, Record Group 204, Pardon Attorney Chicago Case Files-Alexander
Cousmos, 002366-012-0394); Record of William Hood, No. 13573, United States Penitentiary,
Leavenworth, KS (on file with National Archives, Washington D.C., Records of the Office of the Pardon
Attorney, Record Group 204, Pardon Attorney Sacramento Case Files-William Hood, 002366-013-0401).
305. Chaplin, supra note 59, at 257; CHESTER, supra note 9, at 210-11.
306. Nicolaas Steelink, Continued Repression and Decline, in SOLIDARITY FOREVER: AN ORAL
HISTORY OF THE IWW, supra note 43, at 201.
307. THE WOBBLIES (Docurama 1979) (1:23:23-33).
308. Throws Scare into Wobblies, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1920, at I19.
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organizing.”309 Miller’s comment is consistent with the judgment of
historians who conclude that prosecutions reduced the union to “a defense
rather than a labor organization, and drained off its leadership, militancy, and
finances in a fruitless defense.”310
Besides deterring and demoralizing the IWW’s membership, the
prosecutions decapitated the organization. For a time in the late 1910s and
early 1920s, nearly all of the union’s leadership was locked up. Normal union
business came to a standstill, with some union offices physically occupied by
federal agents for months and some raided again during the trials.
Inexperienced volunteers had to take over at headquarters. Under the
authority of the Espionage Act and its temporary amendment, the 1918
Sedition Act, huge amounts of union mail were intercepted or banned from
the mails, including fundraising and defense materials,311 making it very
difficult for the IWW to function.312
The prosecutions also cost the union a great deal of money. In the two
years leading up to 1920, the IWW raised an astounding $400,000 for general
defense and $500,000 for bail, spending all of it.313 In the five years that
followed, it spent another $500,000 in legal costs.314Assistance from the
ACLU, which raised considerable funds from sympathetic professionals and
wealthy individuals, was crucial. But adequate fundraising also depended on
the generosity of fellow workers, whose spirit of solidarity often exceeded
their financial resources.315
Inevitably, the IWW’s constant struggle to cover costs converged with
the more immediate effects of all the arrests and convictions to drive the
union into crisis. Federal agent Edward Morse’s reports made from San
Francisco in 1921 about the “IWW situation” in the Bay Area recounted the
union’s struggles to gather a quorum at its meetings and recruit new
309.
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members, as well as its inability, being “practically out of funds,” to muster
the $10,000 needed to bail out five of seven members arrested in Oakland.
Wobblies in the area were “very much demoralized,” he related, and more
arrests would “no doubt materially increase their discomfort.” Indeed, the
Wobblies were in “a very confused condition, as the Defense Treasury is
nearly exhausted and they are at a loss where to turn for funds to defend the
men who are now in jail.”316
D. The Demise of the IWW
By 1925, the IWW was largely defunct. Its decline was the product of a
number of factors aside from the immediate effects of repression, including
the rise of Communism. Although it vacillated a bit on the question, the
union—built around a congenital opposition to the statism that inhered in the
Bolshevik movement, and intent on preserving its independence—resisted
repeated appeals to join the world Communist movement.317 But individual
Wobblies did answer the Communist call. Big Bill Haywood headlined the
exodus of approximately two thousand members, including many capable
leaders, who found their way into one or another of the Communist parties
that emerged in the United States from the summer of 1919 into the early
1920s.318
Even more influential in the union’s ultimate demise was a great internal
schism, the culmination of a number of smoldering factional disagreements,
which fully unfolded at the union’s 1924 convention and left behind it two
rival organizations, neither of which was viable.319 The schism was in many
ways as much a culmination of the union’s problems as it was an independent
cause of its demise. When the 1924 convention opened, the IWW was already
divided into two factions. One, whose stance on Bolshevism was relatively
open and pragmatic, was concentrated in Chicago and on the Great Plans,
and strongly associated with the AWIU; it favored a culture of centralized
control of the union. The other, staunchly anticommunist and concentrated
among lumber workers in the Northwest, was more strongly anti-statist and
rejected centralized control of local factions, particularly in regard to the
license of workers to go out on strike. But this rupture was also shaped by
repression. Bitter disputes that had arisen out of the clemency disputes among
federal prisoners remained points of dissention. The “decentralizers,” their
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ranks replete with those who resisted early release, still very much resented
those who had left prison early.320
The schism had also been inflamed by a shortage of funds as well as
myriad disagreements surrounding them: disagreements about how they were
raised and spent, about payments due to lawyers and bondsmen, about
whether legal defense work was a worthwhile alternative to organizing work
and direct action, and, circling back to the question of centralized versus
decentralized control, about who should decide these questions.321 At the
union’s 1924 convention, one of the many raging arguments was whether, in
fighting the criminal syndicalism laws, the union should have expended so
many resources in trying to prove that the IWW was a legitimate union in the
first place, as opposed to embracing its fate as an outlaw organization.322
In fact, it seems clear that in all these ways—by worsening the schism,
by draining the union’s resources, by disrupting its operations, by
demoralizing its members—repression was indeed a leading reason behind
the IWW’s demise. But contrary to the suggestions of some scholars, it took
some time for the effects of repression to take hold. The many prosecutions
during the war certainly left the union damaged. But they did not destroy the
organization, whose membership and influence rebounded in the early
1920s.323 Nevertheless, there were more arrests and prosecutions to come,
particularly west of the Mississippi, where the union seemed positioned to
hold its ground. The union simply could not withstand all of this, and by 1925
it had largely collapsed, surviving only as a band of several thousand diehards who found security from further repression only through their own
irrelevance.324 To be sure, the IWW is still around today, but it remains, as it
has been since the 1920s, only a shell of what it once was.
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VI. THE RISE AND FALL OF COMMUNIST UNIONISM AND THE LEGACIES OF
ANTI-IWW REPRESSION
This story of how repression destroyed the IWW is a revelation about
the politics of Progressivism, the liberal state, and its legal system. In this
regard, what happened to the IWW was in many ways the clearest validation
of a thesis that defined the IWW from the time of its founding: the union was
destined to be persecuted, and this persecution was bound to feature
Progressives and the law, no matter how peaceful the union’s methods might
have been. Ironically, it was an appreciation of this that informed the union’s
voluntarist vision, even if, in the end, the clearest foresight afforded the IWW
no way of avoiding its fate.
At the same time, what befell the IWW turned the page on another
chapter in the history of labor relations in the United States, one that reveals
other important and related truths about Progressivism, law, and the state,
and their bearing on labor. The destruction of the IWW cleared the way for
the rise of a new and very different tradition of left-wing unionism, this one
defined not by voluntarism but by a marked faith in the state and its legal
system and a close alliance with liberal reformers. At the center of this new
tradition was the Communist Party, which in the 1930s became both the
primary sponsor of this new unionism and the curator of its collapse later in
the century.
A. The “Third Period” and the Advent of Communist Unionism
The birth of the Communist Party in the United States can be traced to
1919, when a wide-ranging rebellion of left-wing dissidents within the
Socialist Party resulted in the formation of several Communist
organizations.325 Well into the 1920s, the movement also remained fractured
by sectarian disputes and unable, despite its founder’s ambitions, to exert
much influence on the labor front.326 But by 1927, as a result of many
intrigues and internal struggles, both in the United States and in the Soviet
Union, the Party had become a more or less centralized organization.327 The
following year, in line with instructions from the Comintern, or Communist
International, which the Bolsheviks had established in 1919 for the purpose
of extending communism beyond Russia, the Party declared that capitalism
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had entered a “third period” in its journey toward crisis and destruction.328
This warranted a dramatic change in strategy; the Party abandoned efforts to
advance its cause by “boring into” existing AFL unions, which had proven
ineffective anyway, in favor of a different approach premised on organizing
its own unions.329
Within a short time, Party activists set out to effectuate the new program.
Among the most salient examples of how their efforts played out can be
found in agriculture. In 1929, a group of Communist unionists set up
something called the Agricultural Workers Industrial League, and attempted
to organize hard-pressed, mainly Hispanic agricultural workers in
California’s Imperial Valley.330 When they did so, they were warned by some
old Wobblies that they would never succeed.331 Indeed, they did not succeed,
in spite of the organizers’ heroic efforts. Just as the Wobblies had said would
occur, repression beat back the Communists’ efforts. Beatings and
intimidation were commonplace; dozens of these organizers and their
supporters were arrested on vagrancy and other charges, and nine were
convicted and sent to prison for criminal syndicalism.332
In the late 1920s and early 1930s, attempts by Communists to organize
in other industries, particularly coal, steel, and textiles, produced the same
response. Hundreds of party members were arrested and jailed on vagrancy
charges, and dozens for criminal syndicalism or sedition, in Pennsylvania,333
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Ohio,334 and Oregon.335 In Kentucky, activism by the Party’s National
Miner’s Union in 1931 and 1932 resulted in hundreds of arrests of strikers
and their supporters for vagrancy and criminal syndicalism. Among those
who faced charges were the great novelists Theodore Dreiser and John Dos
Passos, leaders of a group of leftist intellectuals where were indicted for
criminal syndicalism after visiting the region in support of hungry and
persecuted strikers.336 To be sure, poor organization and sectarianism were
also major, and often debilitating, reasons for failure, as was frequently
venomous competition from AFL unions.337 Nevertheless, repression clearly
played a critical role.
B. The Popular Front and the Heyday of Radical Unionism
Although they were by most measures unsuccessful, efforts by
Communists to organize their own unions had important consequences for
the future of the American labor movement. Communist unionists during this
Third Period made important inroads on racial discrimination in the labor
movement while also cultivating or, particularly in places where the IWW
had been active, reviving radical ambitions and a spirit of militancy among
workers that had waned though much of the 1920s.338 Their activism was
likely an important impetus to the enactment of reformist labor legislation in
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this period.339 Moreover, the Party itself profited by these efforts.
Membership, which had plummeted from as many as 30,000 or 40,000 when
the movement first emerged to fewer than 10,000 at the advent of the Great
Depression, reached about 25,000 in 1934.340 But in the face of repression
and continued conflict and completion with AFL unions, the Party’s unions
were never able to establish a firm footing anywhere or permanently organize
the industrial and agricultural workforce, which remained almost entirely
under the dominion of the open shop. When, driven by the Soviet Union’s
own emerging interests in rapprochement with liberal, western governments,
and in forging a common front against fascism, the Comintern announced a
new policy of compromise, the Party again altered course and adopted what
came to be known as its “Popular Front” program.
The Popular Front can be understood not only as an act of compliance
with dictates from Moscow, but also a product of the Party’s domestic
situation. Even though “boring into” AFL unions had not produced many
lasting results in the 1920s, the strategy had deep roots in the Party’s identity
and in the outlook of important figures like William Z. Foster, a former
Wobbly who, by the 1930s, had emerged as one of the Party’s foremost
leaders.341 Moreover, if the Popular Front can be understood on the
international stage as a strategy for facing the rising threat of fascism, it
should also be understood domestically as, in part, a way evading the kind of
repression they faced in the Third Period and that the Wobblies had endured
in the 1910s and 1920s.
Initially defined by a less hostile and competitive relationship to other
leftist organizations, the Popular Front quickly went beyond this, evolving
into a partnership with liberal elements of the New Deal and the labor
movement.342 As Michael Goldfield has put it, the change that this entailed
in Party politics was dramatic, as the Party not only “dropped its
revolutionary slogans” but also “in most cases even failed to criticize” its new
“allies.”343 This “slavish” subordination to capitalist politics and interests, as
he described it, coincided with further increases in Party membership and an
unprecedented level of political influence and legitimacy.344
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The compromises of the Popular Front period earned the Party an
immunity from persecution that the Wobblies could not have dreamed of
during their heyday, and that many of the Party’s own members would no
doubt have had difficulty imagining a few years earlier. Although
prosecutions of Communists for criminal syndicalism and similar crimes did
not cease entirely, after 1935 they became much less common.345 Indeed,
Oregon and Washington repealed their criminal syndicalism laws.346
Likewise, it was in this period that the courts finally retreated somewhat from
their practice of endorsing the almost unfettered use of criminal syndicalism
and similar laws to persecute radicals. This shift in the courts was
underscored in 1937, when, without overturning Whitney, the Supreme Court
set aside the convictions of Communist activists in two separate cases that
had arisen earlier in the decade.347
The new arrangement was of enormous benefit to the Party’s liberal
allies as well as to many workers. The infusion of untold thousands of
Communist organizers, many with significant experience, considerable
credibility, and enormous dedication, was central to the remarkable rise of
the CIO.348 The new federation emerged out of the AFL in 1935.349 By the
summer of 1936, the CIO was independent of the AFL.350 And by the end of
that year, it was at the center of an extraordinarily ambitious, often violent,
and remarkably successful attempt to organize the industrial workforce.
Working through the CIO, Communists played a crucial role in the great and
tumultuous strikes and organizing drives of the 1930s, including titanic
struggles in automobiles, steel, rubber, glass, and maritime transport.351
Popular Front unionists, Communists and otherwise, embraced the idea
of strikes and direct action. It is no accident, for instance, that the dramatic
1936 to 1937 General Motors Sit-Down Strike, which propelled the CIO to a
broad string of victories over the open shop, was primarily organized by
Communist unionists.352 Nor is it a coincidence that 1937, during the first half
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of which the CIO made its most dramatic inroads against open shop
employers, was also one of the great strike years in American history. In
1937, the federal government counted a total of 4,740 strikes involving one
out of every fifteen workers.353 Despite the fact that the CIO had gained its
independence from the AFL just a year earlier, the strikes it led in 1937
accounted for 60 percent of workers on strike that year. Moreover, despite
the concentration of CIO strikes in open shop strongholds, the majority of its
strikes that year were successful.354
But—unlike anything contemplated by the IWW—the success of
Popular Front unionism relied on much more than direct action. Reflecting
the remarkable degree to which this new iteration of left-wing unionism had
repudiated the voluntarism that defined the IWW, the CIO’s success was
simultaneously premised on cooperating with New Deal politicians and
working within mainstream political institutions.355 Of course, the scale and
intensity of workers’ struggles in this period must also be taken into account.
At no point in its history did the IWW ever come close to mobilizing workers
on such a scale, even during the fateful period in 1917 that gave rise to
escalating attempts to destroy the union.
The new mode of unionism involved an alliance between leftist
unionists and the political successors of the same movement—
Progressivism—whose members had taken a leading role in the prosecution
of their radical predecessors not two decades earlier. Popular Front unionists
courted the favors of New Deal politicians at every level of government, from
Franklin Roosevelt and his capable but consummately moderate Secretary of
Labor, Frances Perkins, down to governors, state attorneys general, judges,
and other officials.356 They also embraced New Deal institutions, particularly
the National Labor Relations Act, or Wagner Act, enacted in the summer of
1935, and the National Labor Relations Board, which Congress established
to enforce the new labor law. In the late 1930s and 1940s, the Wagner Act
and the NLRB were crucial weapons in Popular Front unionists’ battles
against open shop employers.357 This reliance on the state deepened during
the Second World War, when Communist unionists, in line with further
direction from Moscow as well as the practical advantages of a broader
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system of regulating wartime production that aided union organizing efforts
in return for their support in ensuring “labor peace,” joined with CIO leaders
in harshly enforcing a “no-strike pledge” to which they had agreed—without
the endorsement of rank-and-file workers—with representatives of the
federal government.358
By entering these arrangements, leftists in this movement shared in a
degree of organizing success that far exceeded anything that IWW had ever
achieved. In 1937 alone, union membership increased by an extraordinary 80
percent, growing from 3.9 million to 7 million men and women, which
represented an increase from 13.7 percent of the non-agricultural workforce
to 22.6 percent of that population of workers.359According to one measure, at
least, by 1939 the CIO unions they helped to found only a few years earlier
could count 4 million members—as many as the AFL.360 Needless to say, the
IWW achieved nothing like this. But unlike IWW unions, with only a few,
relatively small exceptions, like the International Fur and Leather Workers
Union, the Farm Equipment Workers Union, and the International
Longshoremen and Warehouse Workers Union, the CIO unions that emerged
during time were not under the control of radicals.
This was true in two ways. First, even if the Party’s prominence within
the CIO gave it significant influence over 40 percent of CIO members in the
late 1930s, as one authority suggests, the Party itself—along with most of the
unions in helped build—was no longer particularly radical.361 Second, as
many leftist unionists associated with the Party would soon came to see, most
of the unions they helped build, including the United Automobile Workers
and the United Steelworkers, as well as the CIO itself, remained firmly in the
hands of liberal (and sometimes not so liberal) leaders like Walter Reuther
and Philip Murray.362 Such leaders not only scorned the Communists’
avowed commitment to toppling capitalism, but also, beginning in the late
1930s and extending into the 1940s and beyond, showed themselves very
quick to purge their unions of Communist influence and organizers whenever
it suited their needs.363 Significantly, among the first organizers to be purged
where those whose appetites for strikes and other forms of direct action
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entrenched upon the CIO’s plans to work with government officials to build
their unions.364
Nor was this the only price that leftists would pay for their turn to this
new kind of unionism. By the late 1930s, courts had already set about
dramatically limiting labor militancy. In the late 1930s and early 1940s,
courts construed the Wagner Act to prohibit sit-down strikes; endorsed the
use of replacement workers, including permanent replacement workers, even
without any particular justification on the part of the employer; opened the
door to aggressive regulation of picketing by local and state police and courts;
and in various ways, began to affirm idea that collective bargaining
agreements limited the extent of the right to strike.365
This all fit very well with what historian Irving Bernstein, who generally
supported this new regime, described as a process by which the “machinery”
of government regulation of labor conflicts came to “substitute” for strikes
and other forms of direct action and collective bargaining came to be
“legalized.”366 In the less generous view of many more critical scholars, this
new system of labor relations that emerged out of the New Deal was, in its
conception, a kind of covenant in which workers gained limited rights to
organize, strike, and engage in collective bargaining, at the expense of
forfeiting the prerogatives to resort to militant tactics or pursue radical
aims.367 This new regime was consolidated in parallel with political changes
that saw the acquiescence of Roosevelt and other New Deal politicians in an
extraordinary purge of union-friendly board members and officials at the
NLRB.368 Unfolding in the late 1930s and early 1940s, this development was
justified as necessary to correct a bias in favor of militant and radical
unionists and CIO organizations in particular.369
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C. The Demise of Radical Unionism and the Crisis of the Labor
Movement
By the late 1930s, a broad coalition was actively trying to amend the
Wagner Act and transform labor policy in ways that would foreclose even
the already-constrained militancy and radicalism that characterized unionism
during the Popular Front period. These efforts, which extended through the
war, finally came to fruition in 1947 with the enactment of the Labor
Management Relations Act, or as it is generally known, the Taft-Hartley Act,
which significantly amended the Wagner Act.370 Although the new law was
mainly conceived by conservative politicians and enacted by a Republicancontrolled Congress, it codified changes that in many cases had been
instituted earlier, with the support or acquiescence of many liberals, who
likewise never honored their promise to the labor movement to get that law
repealed.371 Among these were new means for punishing unions and workers
that engaged in sit-down strikes or used mass picketing or sympathy strikes
to pressure employers.372
Although a bitter pill for many in the labor movement to swallow, this
shift in labor law and policy was also entirely consistent with the overall
course of American politics and American liberalism in the postwar period.
As scholars like Jefferson Cowie have argued, the Depression years were an
historical aberration that rested on an economic crisis which made the
capitalist class and its supporters in government uniquely—but
temporarily—open to a measure of compromise and reform.373 Likewise,
during the war, hostility to Communism was muted by the country’s military
alliance with the Soviet Union.374 But by the late 1940s, things had changed.
The war not only ended the Depression; it also restored the wealth and power
of the business community and renewed their willingness to challenge unions
and radicals and to oppose reform. And when the war drew to a close amid
an extraordinary wave of strikes, the Popular Front gave way to the Cold
War.375 Under these conditions, liberalism resumed its hostility to radicalism,
which it wrapped up in professed concerns about state security and threats of
370. Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (2006)).
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sedition, that harkened back to the way Progressives had treated the IWW in
the 1910s and 1920s.376
Remarkably, the renewal of repression occurred with the initial support
of the Communist Party. In 1940, when it was still closely allied with the CIO
and the New Deal, the Party supported the prosecution and conviction of
eighteen Trotskyist unionists under a provision of the federal Alien
Registration Act of 1940 that was essentially a criminal syndicalism
statute.377 Beginning in 1949, though, the Communist themselves felt the
brunt of this repression as a sustained wave of Cold War repression
supplanted the “Little Red Scare.” By 1956, over 100 Communists, including
virtually all of the Party’s leadership, were prosecuted and, in most cases,
imprisoned under this very statute.378 Notably, their convictions were
consistently upheld by courts that made ready use not only of precedential
cases like Abrams and Whitney but also of the clear and present danger test,
and even Justices Holmes and Brandeis’s reasoning in formulating and
describing that doctrine.379
The legal assault on organized labor occurred in a context in which the
Party had already, as a result of its faith in the Popular Front, lost its footing
within the labor movement. By the time it merged back into AFL in the mid1950s, the CIO had long since purged itself of many thousands of Communist
unionists and pushed out or lost the allegiance of entire unions with a strong
leftist orientation, like the Fur Workers, the Farm Equipment Workers, the
ILWU, and the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers. These
developments comported with the politics of the time and cynical
calculations of labor leaders. But they were also to some degree mandated by
the labor law itself: section 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act effectively required
that the unions purge themselves of Communists.380
For a time, the broader consequences of these developments for the labor
movement remained unclear. Although no longer growing as it had in the
1930s and 1940s, overall membership remained both historically very
376. This hostility to radicalism was a defining feature of Cold War liberalism. ROBERT J.
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extensive and stable, reaching about 35 percent of the non-agricultural
workforce in the mid-1950s.381 Equally impressive—for a time, at least—was
the political and economic power of the unions themselves, as labor leaders
became important players in American politics.382 While the number of
strikes per year also remained high through the 1960s, these tended to be
much tamer affairs than in the 1930s and 1940s, usually aimed at bolstering
unions’ positions in collective bargaining rather than organizing, let alone
promoting some kind of revolutionary purpose.383
Although the extent of postwar consensus or détente between labor and
capital has been exaggerated, it did seem that some kind of modus vivendi
prevailed.384 Union influence remained significant, if not overwhelming, both
in politics and in collective bargaining, and labor standards gradually
improved. But by the early 1970s, a new and grim reality began to set in as a
changing liberalism, operating in a shifting economic environment, found
that it no longer had much use for this kind of arrangement, or even for a
strong relationship to the working class.385 Under increasing pressure from
business groups, the state gradually abandoned all but a pretense of
supporting organized labor, the labor law devolved into a system that does as
much to restrain labor rights as to advance them, and the relationship between
the labor movement and the Democratic party—a key legacy of the New Deal
and the Popular Front—evolved into what Mike Davis memorably described
as the “barren marriage,” wherein the labor movement served as a fundraising
and get-out-the-vote organization for a party that somehow managed never
to deliver even the most conventional kinds of reforms.386
While conservatives went on an open offensive against labor, railing
about corrupt union bosses, coercive labor laws, and the debilitating
inefficiencies of collective bargaining,387 liberals adopted a different
approach, one that can be seen in the politics of Democratic Presidential
administrations from Jimmy Carter’s though Bill Clinton’s and Barack
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Obama’s. These liberals continued to pander to labor, in the fashion of every
Democratic administration since the New Deal. Backed by their party’s
leaders in Congress, these presidents endorsed, respectively, the Labor
Reform Act of 1977, the replacement worker bills of the early 1990s, and the
Employee Free Choice Act of the late 2000s.388 But neither they nor their
colleagues in Congress secured the passage of these bills, which all failed. At
the same time, while each of these presidents made somewhat more
reasonable appointments to the NLRB, they also endorsed economic
programs that contributed to the labor movement’s continued demise.389
In the meantime, as liberals turned against even the mainstream of the
labor movement, there was no resurgence of radical unionism of the sort that
brought the IWW or the Popular Front to prominence. Among the many
factors that account for this was the Cold War, whose consuming politics
undermined the legitimacy and, at times, legality of every kind of leftism.
But the lack of any rebirth of labor radicalism was also the result of postwar
liberalism’s antipathy to this kind of unionism; indeed, as the IWW’s
experience confirmed, such an aversion was fundamental to the entire project
of Progressivism. With the desperation and uncertainty of the Depression and
war years rapidly fading, postwar liberals, including mainstream labor
leaders, saw no need to set aside this antipathy and ally with, let alone
cultivate, a new generation of radicals. And what passed for radicalism also
changed, evolving in the 1960s into a “New Left” defined by its diminished
interest in class and ambivalence about organized labor, which, ironically,
had a significant basis in the labor movement’s anticommunist politics.390
Ironically, too, the faded relevance of the kind of radicalism that the
Communist Party preached also cleared the way for the Supreme Court to
finally to overturn Whitney in 1969 and impose significant limits on the
enforceability of criminal syndicalism and similar statutes.391
The significance of the labor movement’s distance from the left became
more evident as the crisis which washed over it in the 1970s extended through
the following decades. Crippled by inertia and a lack of vision, the labor
movement’s response never involved much beyond a combination of
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disbelief, disappointment, and desperate attempts to resurrect—through
attempts at statutory reform, for example—the old arrangements that had
been forged in the 1930s and 1940s and that had carried the movement
through the postwar period. Most of the gains that labor movement made
since the 1930s have been lost. Union density in the private sector has sunk
to about 6 percent, strikes have become extraordinarily uncommon, even as
labor standards continue to deteriorate, and unions’ political influence has
diminished to negligible levels.392 Under these circumstances, both the
mainstream of the labor movement and the movement’s radical supporters
are left to reckon not only with the true nature of the bargain their
predecessors struck decades ago with liberals and the state but also with the
fate of a union whose destruction at the hands of Progressives and the state
presaged these more recent developments.
CONCLUSION
Over forty years of unremitting crisis and decline have led many to argue
that labor needs a resurrection of the kind of radicalism, or at least robust
reformism, that so often characterized the movement in the early twentieth
century, as well as a fundamental change in the nature of the debate about
what unions are, where they stand in the world, and how they should
function.393 Those who favor such a turn must confront the obvious
impediments to accomplishing this, which, as this Article suggests, include
the challenge of successfully navigating a political and legal culture in which
not only conservatives but also Progressives or liberals are apt to stand in the
way of reform.
Indeed, the IWW’s experience confirms the essential truth of its own
commitment to voluntarism, which is that the state and its legal system
simply could not be trusted to serve as a custodian of workers’ interests, at
least not when those interests impinged in a serious way on those of powerful
capitalists and their champions in law and government. At the same time,
what happened to the IWW’s successors during the Popular Front period and
to the labor movement more broadly through the postwar years, when
unionists retreated from voluntarism in the hope of reaching some enduring
accommodations with the state and its legal system, lends great support to
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the Wobblies’ skepticism of this kind of activism, even when Progressives or
liberals are in control.
In these respects, this Article’s story of repression has immediate
relevance, as it raises troubling questions about the feasibility of the kind of
unionism that came to prominence in the Popular Front period, and that many
left-leaning reformers today hope to resurrect.394 With a zeal that is quite
understandable in light of the great gains that labor made during the 1930s
and 1940s, these reformers dream of a renewed Popular Front, based in
functional alliances between workers and Progressives, and backed by the
authority of the law and the state. Like many Popular Front unionists, they
see what the IWW endured a century ago as further reason to put aside that
union’s voluntarism, move beyond its thrilling but implausible attempt to
repudiate law and the state, and instead embrace what surely seems like a
more reasonable and practical way of improving labor’s position. But these
reformers would be wise to confront perhaps the most important truth in the
story, which is that only in the wake of the very kind of distant revolution
that the IWW vainly sought to bring about are efforts to fundamentally
reform the condition of labor in society likely to escape for long the
reprimands, not only of conservatives who straightforwardly reject labor’s
demands, but of Progressives and liberals who stand ready to declare that
labor’s demands go too far.
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